

Ekološka bezbjednost u Crnoj Gori

Stanje, akteri, pritisci i preporuke

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Sadržaj

Sažetak i ključni nalazi.....	3
1. Uvod: ekološka država u postjugoslovenskoj tranziciji	4
2. Kriza upravljanja prirodnim resursima	5
3. Domaći i međunarodni kontekst.....	7
4. Stanje životne sredine i ljudska bezbjednost	9
5. Ekološki kriminal i institucionalni odgovor	12
6. Ekološki pokret: organizacije, inicijative i aktivisti	13
7. Studije slučaja i ostvareni rezultati	21
8. Pritisci, rizici i potrebe aktivista.....	27
9. Preporuke.....	30
10. Zaključak	32
Izvori.....	33

Sažetak i ključni nalazi

Crna Gora ne pati prvenstveno od nedostatka ekoloških normi, već od načina na koji se prirodnim resursima upravlja i na koji način se sprovode norme. Ustavni status ekološke države i napredovanje u Poglavlju 27 nijesu još uvijek nisu proizveli dosljednu zaštitu prostora, voda, vazduha, šuma i biodiverziteta. Centralni rizik čini spoj razvojne politike koja prostor i resurse tretira kao robu za kratkoročnu valorizaciju, fragmentisanih nadležnosti, slabih inspekcija sa nedostatkom kadrovskog kapaciteta, selektivne primjene zakona i ograničene odgovornosti za štetu. Posljedice nijesu samo ekološke: one se mjere zdrastvenim posljedicama, velikim ekonomskim gubicima, gubitkom čiste vode i zemljišta, pritiskom na turizam i poljoprivredu, migracijama i slabljenjem povjerenja u institucije. [1][2]

Podaci za 2024. i 2025. godinu upravo pokazuju razmjere problema. U Pljevljima su dnevne vrijednosti PM10 tokom 2024. prekoračene 95 dana, a u Bijelom Polju 103 dana, dok je dozvoljeno 35. Samo sedam od 30 ispitanih riječnih lokaliteta imalo je zahtijevani ukupni status kvaliteta voda. Od 375.252 tone obrađenog komunalnog otpada, 91,6% je odloženo, dok je materijalno reciklirano približno 0,27%. Državno tužilaštvo je u 2025. imalo u radu prijave protiv 527 lica za krivična djela protiv životne sredine i uređenja prostora; 225 prijava ostalo je neriješeno na kraju godine. [3][4][14]

Istovremeno, građanski otpor je proizveo stvarne promjene. Kampanje protiv malih hidroelektrana pretvorile su lokalnu odbranu rijeka u nacionalno političko pitanje i doprinijele praktičnom zaustavljanju odobravanja novih MHE i raskidu sedam ugovora poslije promjene vlasti 2020. godine. Građanska inicijativa u Mojkovcu, uz stručnu i NVO podršku, doprinijela je raskidu koncesionog ugovora za rudnik Brskovo 2024. Još od 2020. Godine traje kampanja za zaštitu izvorišta Bolje sestre i rijeke Morače i ista je po prvi put podstakla državu da "objavi rat protiv građevinske mafije" i da kao ishod imamo hapšenja moćnih vlasnika kompanija i rušenja njihovih nelegalnih separacija u zaštićenoj zoni vodoizvorišta. Kampanja za zaštitu Velike plaže ujedinila je civilni sektor i iznijela pitanje sporazuma sa Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima i planirani projekte kompanije Eagle Hills na nacionalni nivo. Kampanja „Čuvaj da te čuva“ povezala je terenske akcije sa digitalnim prijavljivanjem i institucionalnim promjenama gradeći sistem i jačajući institucije kroz monitoring civilnog sektora ali i predstavnika Evropske unije.. Ovi uspjesi, međutim, ostaju krhki dok nijesu pretvoreni u trajna pravila, sistemska rješenja kao i trajne i mjerljive ishode. [11][16][18][20]

- Ekološka bezbjednost mora se tretirati kao ljudska bezbjednost: zdravlje, voda, hrana, stanovanje, rad i otpornost na požare, suše i poplave.
- Ekološki kriminal zahtijeva finansijske istrage i praćenje koristi proistekle od istog, a ne samo uklanjanje posljedica na terenu.
- Civilni sektor je raznovrstan: stručne NVO, lokalne inicijative, neformalne mreže, omladinski pokreti, novinari i individualni aktivisti imaju različite resurse, ali i različite rizike sa kojima se suočavaju, a samim tim i potrebe..
- Najveća slabost ekološkog pokreta nije nedostatak ideja, već mali broj ljudi, kratkoročno finansiranje, administrativno iscrpljivanje, bezbjednosni pritisci i "pregorijevanje".
- Institucionalni pomaci iz 2025–2026. Biće dugoročni samo ako se popune kadrovski deficiti, ako službe dobiju adekvatnu opremu, centralni javni registar predmeta, zadate rokove i jasno mjerljive rezultate.

1. Uvod: ekološka država u postjugoslovenskoj tranziciji

Crna Gora je Deklaraciju o ekološkoj državi usvojila na Žabljaku 20. septembra 1991, a ekološko opredjeljenje potom ugradila u ustavni poredak. Deklaracija je donesena u završnoj fazi jugoslovenskog socijalističkog sistema i na početku duboke političke, ekonomske i institucionalne transformacije koje su u početku pratile ratne i ekonomske krize. Razvoj ideje ekološke države zato se ne može analizirati izvan postjugoslovenskog i postkomunističkog konteksta u kojem su se istovremeno odvijali promjena državnog statusa, tržišna tranzicija, privatizacija, deindustrijalizacija pojedinih područja i uspostavljanje novih modela koncesija i upravljanja prostorom. [1][70]

Ovaj istorijski okvir objašnjava dio raskoraka između snažne simboličke obaveze i slabije institucionalne prakse što je sve dovelo do stanja na terenu kad govorimo o očuvanju prirodnih resursa i prostora. Nakon društvene privatizacije industrije, prirodni resursi postali su važan razvojni i politički kapital, dok su inspekcije, lokalne službe, sistem podataka i mehanizmi odgovornosti ostali fragmentisani ili nedovoljno snažni kako u kapacitetima tako i u otpornosti na korupciju koja je i dalje prisutna u crnogorskom sistemu. Pojmovi postjugoslovenske i postkomunističke tranzicije ovdje nijesu univerzalno objašnjenje svih problema, već analitički okvir za razumijevanje kontinuiteta industrijskog nasljeđa, promjena vlasništva i pojave novih privatnih interesa u upravljanju vodom, šumama, obalom, rudama i zemljištem.

Istraživanje odgovara na četiri pitanja: koji ekološki problemi najviše ugrožavaju građane i zajednice; zbog čega nastaju ovi problemi i gdje institucije zakazuju u rješavanju i prevenciji istih; ko čini ekološki pokret i kojim metodama isti djeluje; te kakva podrška je potrebna da bi aktivisti i organizacije dugoročno štitili javni interes, kao i koje su institucionalne reforme potrebne kako bi se izgradio sistem otporan na korupciju i efikasan u rješavanju ekoloških problema.

1.1. Metodološka napomena

Analiza kombinuje: (1) zvanične podatke EPA, MONSTAT-a, Evropske komisije, Državnog tužilaštva, MUP-a i Energetske zajednice; (2) pravne i političke analize; (3) izvještaje organizacija i relevantne medijske istrage; i četiri dubinskih intervjua sa Miodragom Vujovićem (KOD), Andrijanom Mićanović (Crnogorsko društvo ekologa), Ivanom Čogurić Rašović (Ecopatriotizam), Milošem Gezovićem (Ljute Kamilice/Heal Boka Bay). Javni izvori obuhvataju period zaključno sa 31. julom 2026.

Intervjui su kvalitativni izvori i ne predstavljaju statistički reprezentativan uzorak. Lična iskustva o pritiscima navedena su kao svjedočenja sagovornika kada za javnost nije dostupna odluka nadležnog organa. Izvještaj ne koristi političke izraze poput „građevinska“ ili „šumarska mafija“ kao unaprijed utvrđene krivičnopravne kvalifikacije, već kao javni okvir kojim su vlasti i mediji opisivali moguće organizovane interesne mreže.

2. Kriza upravljanja prirodnim resursima

Poblemi ekološke bezbjednosti u Crnoj Gori nijesu skup međusobno nepovezanih incidenata. Oni ukazuju na širi problem sistemskih propusta upravljanja prirodnim resursima i prostorom. Kratkoročna ekonomska korist od pojedinih investicija i eksploatacije resursa pripada ograničenom broju aktera, dok troškove zagađenja, gubitka prostora, narušavanja zdravlja i sanacije štete snose građani, lokalne zajednice i javni budžeti.

Takav obrazac prepoznaje se u neplanskoj urbanizaciji obale, nelegalnoj eksploataciji šljunka i šuma, nekoradu kamenoloma, zavisnosti energetskog sistema od uglja, izgradnji infrastrukture u ekološki osjetljivim područjima i sistemu upravljanja otpadom koji se još u velikoj mjeri zasniva na nelegalnom odlaganju ili čak i paljenju uz postojanje samo dvije legalne sanitarne deponije.

Problem, dakle, nije razvoj sam po sebi, već način na koji se donose i sprovode odluke o korišćenju prostora i prirodnih resursa. Procjene uticaja na životnu sredinu često se svode na formalno ispunjavanje procedure, javnost se uključuje tek kada su ključne odluke već donesene, nadležnosti institucija se preklapaju, dok inspekcijski nadzor i sankcije često nemaju dovoljno odvraćajuće dejstvo od kršenja propisa. U takvom sistemu nastavak štetne ili nezakonite prakse može biti ekonomski isplativiji od poštovanja propisa.

Ekološki aktivisti zbog toga često prvi otkrivaju i dokumentuju probleme, obavještavaju javnost, podnose prijave i povezuju građane sa nadležnim institucijama. Iako njihov rad ima važnu kontrolnu i korektivnu ulogu, aktivisti ne mogu niti treba da zamijene institucije odgovorne za zaštitu životne sredine i sprovođenje zakona.

Centralna teza ovog istraživanja jeste da najveći izazov ekološke bezbjednosti u Crnoj Gori nije samo broj pojedinačnih slučajeva, već sistem upravljanja u kojem privatna korist od korišćenja prirodnih resursa često ostaje koncentrisana, dok se ekološke, zdravstvene i finansijske posljedice prenose na cijelo društvo.

Tragovi eksploatacije



Ilustrativni kolaž pritisaka na rijeke i prirodne resurse.

3. Domaći i međunarodni kontekst

3.1. Ekološka država između Ustava i izvršenja

Ustav Crne Gore definiše državu kao ekološku i garantuje pravo na zdravu životnu sredinu. Taj normativni identitet stvara snažno očekivanje, ali ne zamjenjuje inspekciju, komunalnu infrastrukturu, podatke i sudsku zaštitu. Evropska komisija je za Poglavlje 27 u 2025. ocijenila da postoji određeni napredak, posebno u propisima o otpadu i pristupanju programu LIFE, ali je istovremeno zahtijevala hitno jačanje administrativnih kapaciteta, inspekcija i koordinacije investicija. Od 281 aktivnosti u akcionom planu, do juna 2025. sprovedeno je 109, odnosno 38%. [1][2]

Budžet za 2026. planiran je na 3,79 milijardi eura, sa kapitalnim budžetom od 305 miliona, uključujući ekološke projekte. Međutim, rashodi relevantni za životnu sredinu rasuti su između više resora, kapitalnih projekata, lokalnih uprava, Eko-fonda i javnih preduzeća. Zbog toga zbirni iznos sam po sebi ne govori koliko je novca usmjereno na inspekciju, prevenciju, monitoring i izvršenje. Programski budžet treba povezati sa ishodima: brojem otklonjenih rizika, kvalitetom vazduha i voda, stopom reciklaže i procesuiranim predmetima. [39]

3.2. Nasljeđe industrije, tranzicije i promjene poslije 2020.

Dio današnjih rizika potiče iz jugoslovenskog industrijskog i energetskog nasljeđa: centralizovane proizvodnje, uglja, velikih industrijskih postrojenja i infrastrukture koja je građena prije savremenih standarda procjene kumulativnih uticaja na životnu sredinu. Nakon toga dug period vladavine dominantne partije kao nasljednice komunizma, period obilježen nepravедnom tranzicijom i masovnom privatizacijom preduzeća, a na kraju i javnih dobara poput prirodnih resursa, a u ovom period Crna Gora postaje i potrošačko društvo bazirano na uvozu, stranim investicijama i uslužnim djelatnostima dominantno u turizmu. Poslije 2020. smjena vlasti otvorila je institucije i smanjila dio straha građana, prema ocjenama više sagovornika, ali nije automatski uklonila klijentelizam, korupciju slabu sistemsku kontrolu kao i kratkoročno neodrživo upravljanje resursima.

Borba protiv MHE pokazuje složeniju sliku. Vlada Duška Markovića je već 2019, nakon snažnih lokalnih protesta, počela preispitivanje politike. Nakon promjene vlasti, 42. Vlada je raskinula sedam ugovora i praktično zaustavila nova odobrenja. To nije bila opšta zakonska zabrana, već politički i upravni moratorijum čiji domet zavisi od daljih odluka. [11][12]

Tokom 43. Vlade Dritana Abazovića ekološki kriminal je dobio vidljiviji bezbjednosni okvir: na Morači su početkom 2023. rušeni nelegalni objekti i zaustavljen rad više operatera, a Nacionalni savjet za borbu protiv visoke korupcije je raspravljao o građevinskom i šumskom kriminalu uključujući kao aktere za suzbijanje sve oblike policije, inspekcija, vojsku kao i Agenciju za nacionalnu bezbjednost. Terminologija „građevinska“ i „šumarska mafija“ bila je politički opis; njen stvarni test su istrage, oduzimanje koristi i trajnost mjera. Nakon smjene 43. Vlade na čelu sa „zelenom partijom“ dugo vremena se čekao nastavak stavljanja fokusa na ekološke izazove kao i na ekološku bezbjednost. Fokus ekoloških izazova dominantno je bio teret civilnog sektora koji je nastavio da ukazuje na propuste i namjere devastacije prirodnih resursa. U jednom momentu ujedinio se skoro cjelokupan civilni sector na jednu stranu u cilju osporavanja Sporazuma između Crne Gore i Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata i kontroverznih investicija kompanije Eagle Hills. Međutim nakon izvjesnog perioda Delegacija evropske Unije u Crnoj Gori pokretanjem kampanje Čuvaj da te čuva ponovo uspostavlja saradnju ekološkog civilnog sektora i aktuelne Vlade na čelu sa Milojkom Spajićem sa ciljem ubrzanog procesa pristupanju EU i značaju saradnje Vlade i Civilnog sektora u ovom procesu [16][17]

3.3. EU, geopolitika i novi pritisci

EU integracije istovremeno jačaju zaštitu i ubrzavaju investicije. Natura 2000, standardi kvaliteta voda i vazduha, klimatsko pravo i Direktiva o ekološkom kriminalu otvaraju alate za odgovornost. Ali evropska potražnja za kritičnim sirovinama, energijom i infrastrukturuom može stvarati nove pritiske ako se tranzicija svede na zamjenu jednog ekstraktivnog projekta drugim. Brskovo, Kruševo, Brajići, Sinjajevina I Komarnica zato nijesu samo lokalni sporovi, već test da li država odlučuje na osnovu kumulativne štete, alternativa i prava zajednice ili pod drugim uticajima.

Međunarodni kapital i kreditori moraju biti predmet istih pravila bez obzira na zemlju porijekla. Kinesko finansiranje velikih infrastrukturnih projekata, evropski fondovi, investitori iz Zaliva i regionalne kompanije mijenjaju pregovaračku poziciju male države. Zaštita javnog interesa zahtijeva objavljivanje ugovora, procjenu fiskalnih i ekoloških rizika i javne konsultacije prije političkog obećanja projekta.

Sinjajevina je primjer preplitanja bezbjednosne i ekološke politike. Sporno područje je vojni poligon, a ne „NATO baza“. Evropska komisija i dalje traži odgovarajuće rješenje. Lokalni stočari i inicijativa Sačuvajmo Sinjajevinu pokazali su da nacionalna bezbjednost ne može biti definisana bez bezbjednosti vode, pašnjaka, hrane i lokalnih egzistencija. [2][40]

4. Stanje životne sredine i ljudska bezbjednost

4.1. Vazduh, energija i pravedna tranzicija Pljevalja

Zagađenje vazduha je najneposredniji javno-zdravstveni rizik. EPA je za 2024. zabilježila 95 dana prekoračenja dnevne vrijednosti PM10 u Pljevljima i 103 dana u Bijelom Polju, uz dozvoljenih 35. U Pljevljima je srednja godišnja koncentracija PM2,5 iznosila 32,76 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$. Problem nije samo Termoelektrana: kućna ložišta, saobraćaj, meteorološke inverzije i drugi izvori stvaraju kumulativnu izloženost. [3]

Procjena Svjetske banke iz 2016. povezala je zagađenje vazduha u Podgorici, Nikšiću i Pljevljima sa više od 250 prijevremenih smrti i oko 140 bolničkih prijema godišnje. To nije aktuelni godišnji bilans, već starija modelovana procjena koja pokazuje razmjer zdravstvenog troška. SZO i EEA potvrđuju da fine čestice povećavaju rizik od kardiovaskularnih i respiratornih bolesti, moždanog udara i karcinoma. [5][6][7]

TE Pljevlja je 2020. potrošila 20.000 sati dozvoljenog rada u opt-out režimu, ali je nastavila sa radom, zbog čega Energetska zajednica vodi postupak. Ekološka rekonstrukcija može smanjiti pojedine emisije, ali ne rješava zavisnost grada od uglja ni dugoročnu usklađenost sa klimatskim ciljevima. Evropska komisija traži plan trajnog zatvaranja i stratešku pravednu tranziciju. [2][8]

Eko-tim je temu preveo iz apstraktne dekarbonizacije u socijalnu politiku. Njihovo istraživanje među zaposlenim ženama u Rudniku uglja i TE pokazalo je visok strah od negativnih posljedica, a organizacija je predložila namjenski program Eko-fonda za diverzifikaciju, prekvalifikacije, mala preduzeća i sanaciju. Vrijednost ovog pristupa je u zahtjevu da sredstva od emisijonih kredita i eko-naknada budu vidljivo vraćena zajednici koja nosi najveći teret tranzicije. [9][28]

4.2. Otpad: rast količina, dominantno odlaganje

U 2024. stvoreno je 375.459,7 tona komunalnog otpada, 4,3% više nego godinu ranije, odnosno 602,2 kg po stanovniku. Uslugom odvoza obuhvaćeno je 88,4% stanovništva. Od ukupno obrađenog komunalnog otpada, 343.742,5 tona ili 91,6% je odloženo. Materijalno je reciklirano 1.016,7 tona, što prema proračunu iz MONSTAT tabele čini približno 0,27% obrađene količine. [4]

To nije samo tehnički problem kontejnera. Uzroci su nedovoljna prevencija, slaba selekcija na izvoru, fragmentisana komunalna preduzeća, nedostatak regionalne infrastrukture, neujednačene usluge na sjeveru i slaba kaznena politika. Jednokratne akcije čišćenja imaju obrazovnu i mobilizacijsku vrijednost, ali bez nadzora, kamera, identifikovanja počinioca i dostupne legalne usluge, deponija se vraća.

Otpad pojačava druge rizike: paljenje guma i plastike zagađuje vazduh; odlaganje u korita i bujične kanale povećava poplavni rizik; plastika i otpad u moru štete ribarstvu i turizmu; neuređene lokacije disproporcionalno pogađaju siromašnija naselja. Prvo postrojenje za usitnjavanje guma, pušteno u rad 2025. sa tehničkim kapacitetom oko pet tona na sat, važan je pomak, ali se rezultat mora mjeriti stvarnom godišnjom količinom preuzetih i obrađenih guma. [19]

4.3. Vode: kvalitet, šljunak, otpadne vode i hidroenergija

Od 30 ispitanih riječnih lokaliteta u 2024, samo sedam, odnosno 23,3%, imalo je zahtijevani ukupni status. Ovaj nalaz pokazuje da bogatstvo vodama ne znači automatsku bezbjednost. Pritisци uključuju komunalne i industrijske otpadne vode, šljunak, gradnju u koritima, male i velike hidroenergetske projekte, otpad i slabu kontrolu. [3]

Svega je šest gradova koji imaju Postrojenja za prečišćavanje otpadnih voda dok Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Plav, Andrijevica, Danilovgrad direktno svoje otpadne vode ispoštaju u rijeke. Takođe Podgorica je započela izgradnju novog PPOV jer postojeće iz komunističkog vremena ima kapaciteta za oko 80000 građana.

Borba protiv MHE bila je jedna od najvažnijih škola lokalnog aktivizma. Bukovica, Bare Kraljske, Lještanica i druge rijeke mobilisale su mještane različitih političkih identiteta jer je voda pitanje opstanka domaćinstva, stočarstva i lokalnog turizma. Green Home je sa partnerima 2019. predao više od 6.300 potpisa za trajno zaustavljanje MHE. Raskid sedam ugovora poslije 2020. bio je politički rezultat tog pritiska, ali pravna analiza RERI-ja upozorava da moratorijum nije isto što i opšta zakonska zabrana. [11][12][26]

4.4. Šume, požari i klimatska otpornost

Šuma nije samo drvena masa: ona reguliše vodu, stabilizuje zemljište, hladi lokalnu klimu, čuva biodiverzitet i smanjuje rizik od odrona i poplava. Global Forest Watch procjenjuje da je Crna Gora od 2001. do 2025. izgubila oko 22 hiljade hektara pokrivača drveća, od čega je oko 4,7 hiljada povezano sa požarima. Gubitak pokrivača nije automatski dokaz nezakonite deforestacije, ali je indikator pritiska koji zahtijeva terensku i upravnu analizu. [10]

Tužilački podaci za 2025. pokazuju 57 novoprijavljenih lica za šumsku krađu i 10 za pustošenje šuma. Za šumsku krađu je, sa zaostatkom, u radu bilo 68 prijava; 29 je odbačeno, a protiv 30 lica podniet je optužni predlog. Broj predmeta ne govori o stvarnom obimu štete, jer zavisi od otkrivanja, evidentiranja i kvalifikacije djela. [14]

Požari zatvaraju krug rizika: gubitak vegetacije pojačava toplotu i eroziju, a suša i toplotni talasi povećavaju vjerovatnoću novih požara. Program obnove opožarenih područja u Piperima i Kučima, pokrenut 2026. u okviru kampanje „Čuvaj da te čuva“, planira početnu revitalizaciju više od milion kvadratnih metara. Njegov uspjeh treba mjeriti preživljavanjem sadnica, obnovom staništa i smanjenjem erozije, ne brojem posađenih stabala na dan akcije. [21]

4.5. Prostor, rudarstvo, kamenolomi i turizam

Nelegalna i neplanska gradnja trajno mijenja prostor. U 2025. tužilaštvu su prijavljena 190 lica za građenje bez prijave i dokumentacije; sa ranijim predmetima u radu je bilo 329 prijava, a 163 su ostale neriješene. Na primorju, gdje su zemljište, obala i infrastruktura pod najvećim pritiskom, šteta se prenosi na kanalizaciju, vodu, saobraćaj, pejzaž i UNESCO vrijednosti Boke. [14]

Miloš Gezović opisuje Boku kao prostor kumulativnog opterećenja: planirani kamenolomi, gradnja, plovila, masovni turizam, otpad u moru i pritisci na Solila i Vrmac ne mogu se ocjenjivati projekat po projekat. Potrebna je procjena nosivog kapaciteta zaliva i zbirnog uticaja na vodu, vazduh, biodiverzitet i kvalitet života.

Brskovo je primjer kako lokalna inicijativa može promijeniti državnu odluku. Građanska inicijativa Zdravi Mojkovac, stručnjaci, Green Home i drugi akteri osporavali su projekat zbog zdravlja, otpada, šuma, voda i blizine sliva Tare. Vlada je 30. maja 2024. raskinula koncesioni ugovor nakon isteka roka za otklanjanje nedostataka. Ovaj ishod je pobjeda mobilizacije, ali i podsjetnik da netransparentni i pravno slabi ugovori mogu proizvesti arbitražni rizik za državu. [34][35]

Komarnica je aktuelni test. CDE, Green Home, CZIP, lokalni ljubitelji prirode i drugi okupljeni oko kampanje Spasimo Komarnicu ukazuju na endemske vrste, pejzaž i veze sa UNESCO područjem Durmitora. EPCG je 2025. privremeno povukao elaborat procjene uticaja radi dopune, dok strateški dokumenti i dalje razmatraju projekat. Povlačenje elaborata nije trajna zaštita; potrebno je prvo odlučiti o režimu zaštite kanjona i energetske alternativama. [36][45]

Gume, dim i požari



Simbolična ilustracija paljenja guma i šumskih požara.

5. Ekološki kriminal i institucionalni odgovor

Krivična djela protiv životne sredine i uređenja prostora u 2025. nijesu marginalna statistika. Podnijete su prijave protiv 348 lica, a sa 179 iz ranijeg perioda ukupno je u radu bilo 527. Protiv 122 lica prijave su odbačene, protiv 155 podniet je optužni predlog, 225 je ostalo u radu. Strukturu dominantno čine bespravna gradnja, šumska krađa, nezakonit ribolov i lov, pustošenje šuma, oštećenje životne sredine i neovlašćena eksploatacija riječnog nanosa. [14]

U septembru 2025. Vrhovno državno tužilaštvo formiralo je multidisciplinarni Operativni tim za borbu protiv ekološkog kriminala. Tim je mapirao regionalni obrazac: šumske krađe i nelegalna gradnja na sjeveru, šljunak u centralnom regionu i nelegalna gradnja na primorju. Njegovi zadaci uključuju koordinaciju, finansijske istrage, međunarodnu saradnju i rješavanje oduzimanja mehanizacije. [14][15]

MUP je u februaru 2026, nakon zahtjeva za slobodan pristup informacijama, potvrdio da je u Sektoru za borbu protiv kriminala sistematizovana Grupa za suzbijanje ekološkog kriminala, u okviru organizacione cjeline koja se bavi korupcijom, ekonomskim kriminalom i finansijskim istragama. To je važna razlika: riječ je o policijskoj grupi i tužilačkom operativnom timu sa različitim ulogama, a ne o jednoj „specijalnoj jedinici“. [13]

Nadzor na terenu



Ilustracija nadzora prostora dronom i kamerom za video-nadzor.

6. Ekološki pokret: organizacije, inicijative i aktivisti

6.1. Nastanak i razvoj ekološkog pokreta u Crnoj Gori

Ekološki pokret u Crnoj Gori nije nastao u jednom trenutku niti ga je osnovala jedna organizacija. Razvijao se postepeno: od ideje ekološke države i prvih lokalnih udruženja, preko profesionalizacije nevladinih organizacija i velikih nacionalnih kampanja, do današnje razgranate mreže lokalnih inicijativa, stručnih organizacija, neformalnih grupa, novinara i individualnih aktivista. Zbog toga je preciznije govoriti o evoluciji ekološkog pokreta nego o jednom datumu njegovog osnivanja.

Simbolički početak ove priče predstavlja usvajanje Deklaracije o ekološkoj državi Crnoj Gori 20. septembra 1991. godine na Žabljaku. Deklaracija je postavila zaštitu prirode i održivi razvoj kao strateško opredjeljenje države, a naredne godine predstavljena je na Konferenciji Ujedinjenih nacija o životnoj sredini i razvoju u Rio de Žaneiru. Ipak, njeno usvajanje ne može se poistovjetiti sa nastankom organizovanog građanskog pokreta. Riječ je prvenstveno o političkom i ustavnom okviru koji je ekološkim inicijativama dao snažan simbol i argument prema kojem se državna politika kasnije mogla kritički ocjenjivati. Upravo je raskorak između deklarisanog opredjeljenja i stanja na terenu postao jedna od trajnih pokretačkih snaga ekološkog aktivizma. Vlada Crne Gore

Prvi jasniji oblik organizovanog građanskog djelovanja javlja se tokom devedesetih godina. Društvo mladih ekologa Nikšić osnovano je 18. januara 1993. godine na inicijativu nikšićkih srednjoškolaca i studenata, što pokazuje da su među prvim nosiocima ekološkog organizovanja bili mladi ljudi okupljeni oko lokalnih problema i ideje praktične zaštite životne sredine. Nekoliko godina kasnije, 1997. godine, osnovan je EXPEDITIO u Kotoru, čime je ekološko djelovanje prošireno na pitanja održivog prostornog razvoja, arhitekture, kulturnog nasljeđa i učešća građana u planiranju prostora. Ove organizacije predstavljale su ranu infrastrukturu pokreta: bile su lokalno ukorijenjene, ali su teme kojima su se bavile postepeno povezivale sa širim pitanjima razvoja države. Društvo mladih ekologa Nikšić, EXPEDITIO

Prekretnica u izgradnji stabilnijeg ekološkog nevladinog sektora nastupila je početkom dvijehiljaditih Green Home su 2000. godine osnovali studenti biologije, dok je iste godine grupa ornitologa, stručnjaka za zaštitu prirode i studenata osnovala Centar za zaštitu i proučavanje ptica- CZIP. U Pljevljima je u tom periodu nastalo Ekološko društvo „Breznica“, usmjereno na posljedice industrijskog zagađenja, zaštitu vodotokova i šuma. Ove organizacije donijele su drugačiji oblik djelovanja: istraživanja, monitoring biodiverziteta, stručne analize, edukaciju građana, učešće u javnim raspravama i saradnju sa međunarodnim organizacijama. Time se ekološki aktivizam počeo razvijati od povremenih akcija ka kontinuiranom i stručnije organizovanom radu. Green Home, CZIP, Ekološko društvo „Breznica“

Prvi veliki dokaz da ekološko pitanje može mobilisati javnost na nacionalnom nivou bila je kampanja „Neću baru, hoću Taru“ iz 2004. godine. Protivljenje projektu hidroelektrane Buk Bijela povezano je mještane, splavare, ekološke organizacije, stručnjake, medije i međunarodne institucije. Aktivisti su istovremeno koristili proteste, peticiju, stručne argumente, obraćanje UNESCO-u i javni pritisak. Kampanja je prevazišla pojedinačne organizacije i prerasla u široku koaliciju okupljenu oko odbrane jednog prirodnog dobra. Skupština Crne Gore je 14. decembra 2004. godine usvojila Deklaraciju o zaštiti rijeke Tare, kojom su odbačeni zahvati koji bi ugrozili kanjon. Ovaj slučaj postavio je obrazac koji će se ponavljati u kasnijim kampanjama: lokalni legitimitet, stručni dokaz, javna mobilizacija i međunarodno ili pravno-institucionalno praćenje uz saradnju sa donosiocima odluka. UNESCO izvještaj o Durmitoru i Tari, hronologija kampanje

Uporedo sa velikim nacionalnim kampanjama razvijao se i dugotrajniji model stručnog zastupanja. Borba za Ulcinjsku solanu pokazala je da ekološki aktivizam ne mora uvijek imati oblik masovnog protesta, već može počivati na višegodišnjem monitoringu, naučnim podacima, pravnom djelovanju i međunarodnom pritisku. Nakon privatizacije Solane i prestanka proizvodnje soli, CZIP, lokalni aktivisti i međunarodni partneri godinama su radili na dokazivanju njenog značaja i sprječavanju prenamjene prostora. Solana je 24. juna 2019. proglašena parkom prirode, a iste godine upisana je na Ramsarsku listu močvara od međunarodnog značaja. Taj rezultat nije bio posljedica jedne akcije, već dugotrajne saradnje lokalnih i

stručnih organizacija sa evropskim institucijama i međunarodnim mrežama za zaštitu prirode. EuroNatur

Dodatni prostor za razvoj ekološkog aktivizma stvoren je pristupanjem Crne Gore Arhuskoj konvenciji 2009. godine. Pravo na pristup informacijama, učešće javnosti u donošenju odluka i pristup pravdi postali su važni alati organizacija i građana. Osnivanje Arhus centra Nikšić u okviru Ekološkog pokreta „Ozon“ 2011. godine simbolizovalo je prelazak sa ekološke edukacije i javnih kampanja na sistematičnije korišćenje pravnih i institucionalnih mehanizama. Ekološki aktivisti više nijesu djelovali samo kao organizatori akcija i protesta, već i kao podnosioci zahtjeva za pristup informacijama, učesnici javnih rasprava, podnosioci prijava i kontrolori rada institucija. OSCE – Arhuska konvencija u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, Ekološki pokret „Ozon“

Slučaj Beransela početkom 2010-ih označio je jačanje lokalnog građanskog otpora. Mještani su godinama blokirali pristup deponiji Vasove vode, tvrdeći da ugrožava njihovo zdravlje, zemljište i rijeku Lim. Tokom protesta suočavali su se sa policijskim intervencijama, privođenjima i prekršajnim kaznama, dok su im stručnu, pravnu i javnu podršku pružale ekološke i organizacije za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Vlada je 2014. odustala od daljeg odlaganja otpada na toj lokaciji, nakon čega je započeta njena sanacija. Beranselo je pokazalo da lokalna zajednica može postati osnovni nosilac kampanje, dok organizovane NVO obezbjeđuju stručnu podršku, kontakte sa medijima i pristup državnim institucijama. Al Jazeera Balkans, Vijesti

Od sredine 2010-ih evropske integracije postale su još jedan važan okvir djelovanja. U aprilu 2016. godine petnaest organizacija osnovalo je Koaliciju 27 radi zajedničkog praćenja usklađivanja propisa i sprovođenja obaveza u oblasti životne sredine i klimatskih promjena. Time se razvio stručni i zagovarački dio pokreta koji prati pregovore sa Evropskom unijom, priprema izvještaje iz sjenke i predlaže izmjene javnih politika. Otvaranjem pregovaračkog poglavlja 27 u decembru 2018. godine ekološke organizacije dobile su dodatni prostor da domaće probleme povezuju sa evropskim standardima i obavezama države. Nacionalna strategija za Poglavlje 27, Vlada Crne Gore – Poglavlje 27

Novi talas ekološkog aktivizma postao je naročito vidljiv između 2018. i 2020. godine. Za razliku od ranijeg perioda, kada su kampanje najčešće pokretale već formirane NVO, u središte djelovanja sada sve češće ulaze mještani koji brane rijeke, šume, pašnjake i izvore od konkretnih projekata. Protesti protiv malih hidroelektrana na Bukovici, Barama Kraljskim, Lještanici i drugim vodotokovima povezali su lokalne zajednice sa ekološkim organizacijama, pravnicima i stručnjacima. Pritisak javnosti doprinio je preispitivanju sistema podsticaja i koncesija, a Vlada je krajem 2020. raskinula sedam koncesionih ugovora. Ove kampanje pokazale su da ekološka mobilizacija postaje snažnija kada građani problem ne doživljavaju samo kao zaštitu prirode, već kao pitanje opstanka domaćinstava, poljoprivrede, stočarstva i lokalne ekonomije. Balkan Green Energy News U istom periodu nastao je pokret „Sačuvajmo Sinjajevinu“. Prve informacije o planovima za uspostavljanje vojnog poligona stigle su do lokalnih zajednica 2018. godine, nakon čega su tokom 2019. organizovani protesti na Sinjajevini i u Podgorici. Kampanja je povezala stočare, lokalne porodice, aktiviste, naučnike i međunarodne organizacije. Iz ovog talasa saradnje 2019. godine nastala je i Koalicija za održivi razvoj – KOR, kao pokušaj povezivanja različitih lokalnih borbi u širu ekološku mrežu. Višenedjeljno dežurstvo i fizičko prisustvo građana na Sinjajevini tokom 2020. spriječili su održavanje planirane vojne vježbe, dok je Vlada u julu 2025. formalno odustala od uspostavljanja poligona. Sinjajevina je pokazala da pokret može istovremeno biti lokalno ukorijenjen, nacionalno vidljiv i međunarodno povezan. Sačuvajmo Sinjajevinu, odluka iz 2025. godine

Tokom 2020-ih pokret se dodatno proširio i tematski diferencirao. Kampanje za Komarnicu, protiv ponovnog otvaranja rudnika Brskovo, nelegalne eksploatacije šljunka na Morači i Cijevni, uništavanja šuma, divljih deponija i gradnje u zaštićenim područjima povezale su klasični ekološki aktivizam sa pitanjima korupcije, upravljanja javnim resursima i odgovornosti institucija. Kampanja za Komarnicu oslonila se na terenska istraživanja, rad naučnika, međunarodnu podršku i protestno-edukativne kampove, dok je u slučaju Brskova lokalno protivljenje bilo povezano sa stručnim analizama i javnim pritiskom, prije nego što je Vlada u maju 2024. raskinula koncesioni ugovor.

Istovremeno su nastajali novi akteri koji nijesu proizašli iz tradicionalnog modela profesionalnih NVO. Ekopatriotizam je 2021. godine nastao kao neformalna ženska grupa okupljena kroz akcije čišćenja i rad

sa lokalnim zajednicama. Inicijative poput Ozelenimo Crnu Goru povezale su volontiranje, pošumljavanje i obnovu degradiranih prostora sa javnim kampanjama i saradnjom sa institucijama. Organizacije kao što su KOD, Crnogorsko društvo ekologa, Eko-tim, Zero Waste Montenegro, Heal the Boka Bay i druge donijele su različite specijalizacije – od analize javnih politika i istraživanja biodiverziteta do upravljanja otpadom, zaštite mora i praktičnih terenskih akcija. Pokret je time postao širi, ali ne i centralizovan. Ekopatriotizam, Ozelenimo Crnu Goru

Najnoviju fazu razvoja obilježava upotreba digitalnih alata, terenskog snimanja, društvenih mreža, dronova i interaktivnih mapa. Platforme za prijavljivanje problema omogućavaju građanima da fotografiju i lokaciju potencijalnog ekološkog prekršaja dostave organizacijama i institucijama, dok mapa crnih ekoloških tačaka objedinjuje podatke o deponijama, otpadnim vodama, kamenolomima, malim hidroelektranama, eksploataciji šljunka, sječi šuma i zagađenju vazduha. Time se aktivizam pomjera od pojedinačnog reagovanja ka sistematskom dokumentovanju problema i praćenju postupanja nadležnih organa. Kampanja „Čuvaj da te čuva“ dodatno je povezala građane, ekološke organizacije, Delegaciju Evropske unije, državne i lokalne institucije u akcijama prijavljivanja, sanacije i prevencije. Crne tačke, Delegacija Evropske unije u Crnoj Gori

Razvoj pokreta posljednjih godina uticao je i na način na koji institucije posmatraju ekološke probleme. Dugotrajno dokumentovanje nelegalne eksploatacije šljunka, šumskih krađa, bespravne gradnje i drugih oblika devastacije doprinijelo je tome da se zaštita životne sredine sve češće razmatra i kao pitanje organizovanog i privrednog kriminala. Tokom 2025. godine date su smjernice za formiranje specijalizovane policijske jedinice ili tima za borbu protiv ekološkog kriminala. To predstavlja značajnu promjenu u odnosu na raniji period, kada su ekološki problemi uglavnom tretirani kao izolovani prekršaji ili komunalna pitanja. Vlada Crne Gore

Posmatran u cjelini, ekološki pokret u Crnoj Gori razvio se iz nekoliko paralelnih tokova: stručne zaštite prirode, lokalnog otpora ugroženih zajednica, građanskog nadzora institucija, pravnog zastupanja, praktičnih terenskih akcija i istraživačkog dokumentovanja ekološkog kriminala. On danas nema jedinstveno rukovodstvo, članstvo ni politički program. Preciznije ga je opisati kao decentralizovan, pluralan i kampanjski organizovan ekosistem aktera, u kojem se saradnja najčešće uspostavlja oko konkretne prijetnje ili prostora.

Upravo je takva struktura istovremeno njegova snaga i slabost. Decentralizovanost omogućava brzo nastajanje lokalnih inicijativa i otežava političku kontrolu pokreta, ali saradnja često zavisi od ličnih odnosa, kratkoročnih projekata i iscrpljujućeg angažmana pojedinaca. Ipak, razvoj od prvih omladinskih udruženja do savremenih kampanja pokazuje da ekološki aktivizam više nije rubna oblast građanskog djelovanja. Postao je jedan od prostora u kojem se neposredno povezuju zaštita prirode, javno zdravlje, lokalni opstanak, upravljanje resursima i vladavina prava.

6.2. CZIP

Centar za zaštitu i proučavanje ptica osnovan je u decembru 2000. i član je BirdLife Internationala i IUCN-a. Njegova posebnost je spajanje terenskog monitoringa, nauke, edukacije i javnog zagovaranja. Dugogodišnji rad na Ulcinjskoj solani pomogao je da područje ostane u fokusu EU, Bernske konvencije i domaće javnosti; CZIP je istovremeno pratio ptice, radio na obnovi staništa, organizovao međunarodne konferencije i pokretao pravne inicijative. [22][23]

CZIP-ov doprinos nije ograničen na ptice. Revizija važnih područja za ptice u 2023. identifikovala je 33 područja, dajući stručnu osnovu budućoj Natura 2000 mreži; organizacija radi na krupnim zvijerima, prašumama, krivolovu, Velikoj plaži i Komarnici. Ovaj model pokazuje zašto aktivizmu trebaju višegodišnji podaci: politička odluka se može promijeniti, ali monitoring čuva dokaz o trendu. Takođe CZIP godinama radi na prevenciji krivolova i razvio se u organizaciju sposobnu da pomogne državnim organima u borbi protiv krivolova i devastaciji životne sredine donirajući neophodnu opremu za rad službama poput Službe zaštite u Nacionalnim parkovima Crne Gore

6.3. Green Home

Green Home su 14. februara 2000. osnovali studenti biologije. Organizacija djeluje kroz programe zaštite prirode i energije/klime, uz rad na otpadu, resursima i evropskim integracijama. Njena snaga je povezivanje tehničke analize sa javnim zagovaranjem: protivljenje hidroelektranama na Morači i MHE, podrška kampanjama za Komarnicu i Brskovo, te praćenje Poglavlja 27. [24]

U kampanji protiv MHE Green Home je povezao lokalne zajednice sa nacionalnom peticijom i pravnim postupcima. Više od 6.300 potpisa predato je Skupštini 2019. Taj broj nije sam po sebi zaustavio projekte, ali je pokazao da pitanje nije izolovan lokalni konflikt i povećao politički trošak nastavka podsticaja za projekte sa malim energetske, a velikim lokalnim uticajem. [26]

6.4. Crnogorsko društvo ekologa

Crnogorsko društvo ekologa osnovano je 10. avgusta 2012. kao nezavisna neprofitna organizacija koja primjenjuje interdisciplinarni pristup i primijenjenu ekologiju. Rad obuhvata mapiranje Natura 2000 staništa, slatkovodne i morske ekosisteme, pećine, šume i visokoplaninske pašnjake. [25]

Andrijana Mićanović naglašava da EU mehanizmi daju civilnom sektoru veći prostor, ali da resori energije, rudarstva i infrastrukture često imaju snažniji politički glas od zaštite prirode. CDE-ov rad na Zeti, Morači i Komarnici pokazuje ulogu stručne NVO: da prije političkog spora utvrdi koje su vrste, staništa i kumulativni rizici stvarno prisutni.

6.5. Eko-tim

Eko-tim je profilisan u energetici, klimi, Zelenoj agendi i pravednoj tranziciji. Organizacija objavljuje analize sprovođenja Zelene agende, prati energetske politike i radi sa zajednicom Pljevalja. Njena inicijativa za namjenski program pravedne tranzicije predlaže da se prihod od emisijih kredita i ekoloških naknada usmjeri na nova radna mjesta, prekvalifikacije, lokalnu infrastrukturu i sanaciju. [28][44]

Ovaj doprinos je važan jer izbjegava prividni izbor između radnog mjesta i zdravlja. Pravedna tranzicija nije datum zatvaranja TE, već ugovor sa zajednicom: ko odlučuje, ko plaća, ko dobija novu priliku i kako se mjeri smanjenje izloženosti zagađenju.

6.6. KOD

KOD povezuje ekologiju sa vladavinom prava i korupcijom. Miodrag Vujović opisuje metod koji počinje prijavom građana, a nastavlja se zahtjevima za informacijama, inspekcijskim inicijativama, prijavama, medijskim pritiskom i dugoročnim praćenjem. Fokus obuhvata nelegalnu eksploataciju kamena, šljunka i šuma, otpadne vode, deponije i obnovu opožarenih područja.

Njegov ključni nalaz je da javna rasprava i radna grupa ne znače saradnju ako institucija ne obrazloži odbijene komentare i ne objavi rokove. KOD upozorava i na projektno finansiranje: slučaj koji traje više godina lako ostaje bez osobe koja ga prati kada se grant završi.

6.7. Ozelenimo Crnu Goru

Ozelenimo Crnu Goru djeluje kao inicijativa i koalicijski most između građana, opština, državnih organa, kompanija i međunarodnih partnera. U okviru tog modela Vuk Vujisić povezuje ranije iskustvo istraživačkog novinarstva — uključujući višegodišnji rad na nelegalnoj eksploataciji šljunka na Morači i Cijevni — sa terenskim akcijama, digitalnim alatima i zagovaranjem specijalizovanog odgovora na ekološki kriminal. Platforme Čuvaj.me i CrneTačke.com treba da pretvore rasutu prijavu u predmet sa vidljivim statusom. [72][73]

Najveći doprinos modela je povratna veza: građanin ne treba samo da pošalje fotografiju, već da vidi ko postupa i kako je predmet završen. Najveći rizik je da platforma postane paralelni sistem bez

obavezujućih rokova. Zato mjesečni podaci o prijavama, odgovorima, sankcijama i ponavljanju problema moraju biti javni i mašinski čitljivi.

6.8. Ecopatriotizam

Ecopatriotizam se predstavlja kao prvi ženski ekološki pokret u Crnoj Gori. Ivana Čogurić Rašović navodi skoro šest godina aktivizma i više od 250 akcija čišćenja, uz noviji fokus na ekofeminizam. Njena perspektiva pokazuje nejednaku raspodjelu ekološke štete i neplaćenog rada: građanke i aktivistkinje često uklanjaju posljedice sistema, dok uzrok ostaje.

Intervju dokumentuje administrativne i psihološke pritiske. Sagovornica opisuje postupak nakon protestnog performansa kao SLAPP koji je, prema njenom navodu, odbačen poslije javne reakcije, kao i slučaj u kojem su njeni lični podaci dostavljeni licu koje je prijavila zbog otpada. I kada postupak ne završi kaznom, vrijeme, strah i trošak mogu odvratiti aktivistu od sljedeće prijave.

6.9. Ljute Kamilice i Heal Boka Bay

Miloš Gezović spaja rad sa djecom i mladima sa zaštitom Boke. Ljute Kamilice koriste radionice i akcije za razvoj navika, dok Heal Boka Bay radi na podmorju, biodiverzitetu i održivom upravljanju zalivom. Aktuelni fokus uključuje kamenolome, deponije, reciklažu, čišćenje podmorja, Solila i Vrmac.

Gezović ukazuje da se ekološki projekti u Boki često posmatraju pojedinačno, iako zajedno mogu preći nosivi kapacitet. U intervjuu navodi ozbiljne prijetnje povezane sa javnim angažmanom i prijetnje sudskim postupkom. Ovaj primjer pokazuje zašto zaštita aktivista mora uključiti procjenu rizika, hitnu pravnu pomoć, digitalnu bezbjednost i jasan policijski kontakt.

6.10. Optimisti

NVU Optimisti je omladinska organizacija iz Nikšića čiji je primarni cilj unapređenje ambijenta za mlade, razvoj omladinskog centra i lokalne mreže. Nije specijalizovana ekološka NVO, ali upravo zato je relevantna: ekološka politika izlazi iz uskog kruga stručnih organizacija kada je preuzmu omladinski, kulturni i lokalni akteri. [27]

Optimisti su učestvovali u mrežama čišćenja i kampanjama protiv plastičnih kesa, uključujući projekat „Treba li vam kesa za ovo?“. Njihova uloga je mobilizacijska i komunikacijska — da odgovornost za otpad i javni prostor povežu sa svakodnevicom mladih.

6.11. Koalicija za održivi razvoj (KOR)

Koalicija za održivi razvoj (KOR) razvijena je kao otvorena građanska platforma i mreža ekoloških i građanskih aktivista i inicijativa koje štite prirodne resurse od devastacije i lošeg upravljanja. Njena vrijednost je u povezivanju lokalnih borbi koje bi pojedinačno ostale izolovane — od rijeka i hidroenergije do rudarstva, Tare, Durmitora i upravljanja prostorom — i u pružanju javne solidarnosti ljudima izloženim znatno snažnijim političkim ili ekonomskim interesima. [58][71]

Aleksandar Dragičević je član i jedno od javno najprepoznatljivijih lica KOR-a, pa se njegov rad u ovom izvještaju posmatra unutar šireg djelovanja koalicije, a ne kao zaseban pokret. Kao dugogodišnji građanski i ekološki aktivista dokumentuje terenske probleme, koristi društvene mreže i medije, podržava lokalne inicijative i povezuje ekologiju sa prostornim planiranjem, korupcijom i javnim interesom. Dobitnik je priznanja za doprinos borbi protiv korupcije u zaštiti životne sredine i javno je predstavljen kao prvi eko-ambasador Crne Gore. [29][31][71]

U Brskovu je javno pratio rad međuresorne komisije i zahtijevao raskid koncesije; na Velikoj plaži kritikovao je netransparentne investicione sporazume; u Zeti je, prema javnim istupima, tokom dvije i po godine imao oko 80 terenskih dana posvećenih šljunku, paljenju i odlaganju otpada i krivolovu. Njegov angažman pokazuje vrijednost individualnog aktiviste koji brzo povezuje slučajeve, ali i ranjivost rada koji zavisi od lične izloženosti. [32][33]

U septembru 2025. prijavio je policiji izjave političara koje je doživio kao prijetnje i poziv da se dolazi na njegovu kuću. Institucije su reagovala, a organizacije civilnog društva osudile targetiranje. Slučaj je važan bez obzira na konačnu pravnu kvalifikaciju: politička poruka prema prepoznatljivom aktivisti može aktivirati širu publiku i proizvesti realan bezbjednosni rizik. [30]

6.12. Kako se uloge dopunjuju i gdje sistem ostaje slab

Pokret nije mreža istovjetnih organizacija. CZIP, Green Home, CDE, Eko-tim i EnvPro proizvode stručne nalaze, pravne i političke analize i dugoročni monitoring. KOD, Ozelenimo Crnu Goru, KOR i drugi aktivistički akteri pretvaraju prijavu građana u javni i institucionalni predmet. Ecopatriotizam, Optimisti i Ljute Kamilice šire ekološku temu prema ženama, mladima i zajednicama koje se inače ne prepoznaju u stručnom jeziku. Heal Boka Bay i lokalne inicijative daju prostornu preciznost: znaju gdje se pritisak pojavljuje, ko je pogođen i da li se problem vratio nakon akcije.

Najuspješnije kampanje spajaju najmanje četiri funkcije: dokaz, lokalni legitimitet, javnu mobilizaciju i pravno-institucionalno praćenje. Slabost nastaje kada jedna osoba pokušava da obavlja sve četiri. Stručna organizacija tada troši vrijeme na kriznu komunikaciju; lokalna grupa bez pravne podrške ulazi u neravnotežan postupak; platforma prikuplja prijave bez kapaciteta da prati njihov ishod; a aktivista postaje jedina javno izložena tačka kampanje.

Funkcija	Akteri koji je najčešće nose	Praznina koju treba zatvoriti
Terenski i naučni dokaz	CZIP, CDE, Green Home, Eko-tim, EnvPro Heal Boka Bay	Višegodišnji monitoring i otvoreni skupovi podataka
Lokalna mobilizacija	Lokalne inicijative, Ecopatriotizam, Optimisti, Ljute Kamilice	Mali grantovi dostupni brzo i bez teške administracije
Javno razotkrivanje i prijava	KOD, Ozelenimo Crnu Goru, KOR, novinari i drugi aktivisti	Siguran kanal, povratna informacija i zaštita ličnih podataka
Pravna i politička promjena	Koalicije NVO, lokalne zajednice, advokati i međunarodni partneri	Kontinuitet poslije završetka kampanje i praćenje izvršenja
Zaštita ljudi	Trenutno fragmentisana i uglavnom ad hoc	Fond za hitnu pomoć, pravni tim, policijska kontakt tačka i psihološka podrška

Intervjui pokazuju i generacijsku dilemu. Prepoznatljivost nekoliko ljudi olakšava mobilizaciju, ali proizvodi zavisnost od njihovog vremena i lične bezbjednosti. Održiva infrastruktura pokreta zato mora ulagati u druge redove stručnjaka, lokalnih koordinatora, komunikatora i pravnika, kao i u zajedničko praćenje predmeta. Rezultati se ne smije izgubiti kada se prestane projekat, promjeni vlada ili osoba koja je slučaj vodila.

6.13. Širi ekosistem organizacija i lokalnih inicijativa

Fokus na desetak najvidljivijih aktera ne smije sakriti širi ekosistem. Dio organizacija ima stalne stručne timove, dio počiva na volonterima, a dio se aktivira kada je ugrožen konkretan prostor. Njihov značaj nije jednak po obimu, ali je komplementaran: neke organizacije proizvode podatke, neke čuvaju institucionalno pamćenje, neke okupljaju lokalnu zajednicu, a neke prenose ekološku temu prema mladima, urbanizmu i kulturi.

Expedio

Expedio iz Kotora djeluje od 1997. na održivom prostornom razvoju, arhitekturi, kulturnom naslijeđu i javnom prostoru. Za ekološku bezbjednost je važan jer pokazuje da devastacija nije samo zagađenje: neplanska gradnja mijenja pejzaž, opterećuje vodu i kanalizaciju, sužava javni prostor i ugrožava kulturne i prirodne vrijednosti Boke. Njihov doprinos je stručna veza između planiranja prostora, participacije građana i zaštite naslijeđa. [47]

Zero Waste Montenegro i Cleanup Montenegro

Zero Waste Montenegro, osnovan 2016, radi na prevenciji otpada, ponovnoj upotrebi, selekciji i modelima bez otpada. Mreža Cleanup Montenegro povezuje više desetina lokalnih grupa i volontera, pa čišćenje koristi kao ulaz u zagovaranje promjene sistema. Posebna vrijednost je pomjeranje fokusa sa pitanja ko će pokupiti otpad na pitanje zašto nastaje, gdje završava i ko snosi trošak; ograničenje nastaje kada komunalna infrastruktura i proširena odgovornost proizvođača ne prate mobilizaciju građana ili kad komunalni sistem ne može ispratiti potrebe zajednice. Zero Waste Montenegro na čelu sa Vanjom Cicmil prati tranziciju upravljanja otpadom i ukazuje na nedostatke i posljedice ukoliko se Crna Gora odluči da sistem upravljanja otpadom zasniva na termičkoj obradi ili spalionicama. [48][49]

Društvo mladih ekologa Nikšić i Ekološki pokret Ozon

Društvo mladih ekologa Nikšić, nastalo 1993, predstavlja organizaciono pamćenje lokalnog pokreta: rad sa mladima, vodama, požarima i prirodom povezuje više generacija. Ekološki pokret Ozon, osnovan 2006, razvio je rad na učešću javnosti, Arhuskoj konvenciji, prijavama zagađenja i zaštiti rijeka. Zajedno pokazuju kako Nikšić, grad industrijskog nasljeđa i snažne volonterske scene, proizvodi i stručni i građanski odgovor. Njihov izazov je isti kao kod mladih grupa: dugotrajni predmeti traže stabilno jezgro, pravnu podršku i javne podatke o ishodu prijava. [50][51]

Naša Akcija i Mreža za omladinski aktivizam Crne Gore

Naša Akcija povezuje volontiranje, razvoj zajednice i zaštitu prostora, posebno u Boki i kroz rad sa mladima. Mreža za omladinski aktivizam Crne Gore okuplja mlade aktiviste, volontere i vršnjačke edukatore i ekološku temu prenosi u širi građanski angažman. Ove organizacije nijesu zamjena za specijalizovane biologe ili pravnike; njihova snaga je stvaranje nove generacije ljudi koji umiju da organizuju akciju, komuniciraju problem i uđu u javni postupak. [52][53]

MSJA i MogUL

Društvo Dr Martin Schneider-Jacoby (MSJA) i Monitoring Group Ulcinj (MogUL) daju lokalnu dubinu borbi za Ulcinjsku solanu i prostor Ulcinja. MSJA povezuje biodiverzitet, lokalnu zajednicu i nasljeđe Schneider-Jacobyjevog rada, dok MogUL koristi građanski nadzor, javne istupe i lokalno antikorupcijsko zagovaranje. Njihov doprinos je politički važan: međunarodni status Solane ne može zamijeniti stalni lokalni pritisak da se odluke izvrše i da korist od zaštite bude vidljiva građanima Ulcinja. [54][55]

Oči Podgorice

Oči Podgorice djeluju kao lokalna informativna i građanska platforma koja fotografiju, video i prijavu pretvara u javno pitanje komunalnog reda, saobraćaja, otpada i urbanog prostora. Organizacija je registrovana 2021, a njen sadržaj je dobio i televizijski format na Javnom servisu. Prednost ovog modela je brzina i veliki broj lokalnih izvora; rizik su neujednačena verifikacija, zavisnost od platformi i mogućnost da vidljivost jedne lokacije zamijeni sistemsko praćenje. Zato svaki viralni slučaj treba povezati sa brojem predmeta, odgovorom institucije i ponavljanjem problema. [56][57]

Koalicija 27

Koalicija 27 organizacije okuplja oko praćenja pregovaračkog Poglavlja 27 i pretvara sektorsko znanje u zajedničke izvještaje i zahtjeve prema državi. Za razliku od kampanjskih mreža okupljenih oko neposredne prijetnje prostoru ili resursu, ovaj model je usmjeren na strukturisani nadzor evropskih obaveza. Njegova održivost zavisi od kontinuiteta između godišnjih izvještaja, dijeljenja podataka među članicama i javnog praćenja odgovora institucija na svaku preporuku. [59]

Lokalne inicijative kao prva linija u zaštiti prirode

Sačuvajmo Sinjajevinu, Spasimo Komarnicu, Zdravi Mojkovac, KANA, Dalje nećeš moći i srodne inicijative nastaju kada prijetnja dobije ime i lokaciju. Njihova prednost je legitimitet ljudi koji žive sa posljedicama i spremnost da predmet prate godinama; slabost su ograničeni novac, pravna podrška i rizik da se grupa raspadne nakon jedne odluke. Najbolji model nije da ih velika NVO zamijeni, već da im obezbijedi ekspertizu, pravnu zaštitu, medijski prostor i arhivu, uz zadržavanje lokalnog vlasništva nad kampanjom.

6.14. Mediji: javni nadzor, vidljivost i borba za okvir priče

Ekološki slučaj postaje politički tek kada je vidljiv, razumljiv i praćen dovoljno dugo. RTCG je 2019. pokrenuo Redakciju za ekologiju i održava posebnu rubriku; Vijesti i TV Vijesti kroz dnevno izvještavanje, Reflektor i Načisto daju nacionalni domet; CIN-CG i Monitor povezuju ekologiju sa korupcijom i institucionalnom odgovornošću; RTV Nikšić i drugi lokalni mediji registruju probleme koji rijetko stižu u nacionalnu agendu. Društvene mreže aktivista ubrzavaju upozorenje, ali redakcija ostaje važna za provjeru, pravo na odgovor i praćenje epiloga. [60][61][68]

Najčešća slabost nije potpuno odsustvo izvještavanja, već epizodnost. Akcija čišćenja ili konflikt dobiju naslov, dok se manje prati da li je izrečena sankcija, sanirana šteta, promijenjen plan ili se problem vratio. Druga slabost je personalizacija: aktivista i političar potisnu podatke, stručnjake i pogođenu zajednicu. Treća je miješanje ekološkog jezika sa investicionim marketingom, posebno kada kompanija sopstveni projekat opisuje kao „zelen“ ili „održiv“ bez nezavisne procjene kumulativnog uticaja.

Mediji koji kontinuirano proizvode sadržaj vezan za ekologiju i prate teme iz zaštite životne sredine RTCG (televizija, radio i portal), Vijesti (televizija, portal, novine), RTV Nikšić, PG TV, Nedeljnik Monitor, RTV Budva, Pobjeda, Dan, Televizija Herceg Novi, portal Feral Bar, Portalanalitika, CDM, ETV, kao i agencija MINA i Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo koji svoje istraživačke priče plasira preko novina i portala Vijesti.

Eagle Hills: označena promocija i uticaj na agendu

BIRN-ova analiza, prenesena na sajtu MANS-a, dokumentovala je da je Eagle Hills Montenegro paralelno sa investicionim planovima i javnim sporovima pojačao donacije, sponzorstva i prisustvo kroz promotivne sadržaje u više medija; zabilježena je i organizovana posjeta dijela novinara projektima kompanije u UAE i Egiptu. Primjeri u Vijestima i na RTCG-u bili su označeni kao promo ili sponzorisani sadržaj, što je važna razlika u odnosu na prikriveno oglašavanje. Ipak, oznaka sama ne rješava pitanje ukupnog uticaja: publika treba da zna ko je platio sadržaj i putovanje, a redakcija mora odvojeno provjeriti ekološke tvrdnje investitora i omogućiti glas lokalne zajednice i nezavisnih stručnjaka. Nema osnova da se iz samog postojanja promocije zaključi da je kupljena uređivačka politika; postoji osnov da se zahtijevaju potpuna transparentnost i urednički zaštitni zid. [62][63][64]

Botun: legitimna briga, infrastruktura i politička polarizacija

Spor oko postrojenja za prečišćavanje otpadnih voda u Botunu pokazuje kako ekološka tema može postati politički identitetski sukob. Mještani imaju legitimno pravo da traže podatke o zdravlju, tehnologiji, mulju, mirisima i kumulativnom teretu uz bazene crvenog mulja. Istovremeno, WBIF projekat je obrazložen zaštitom Morače, Skadarskog jezera, javnog zdravlja i vodosnabdijevanja Podgorice. Medij mora držati obje činjenice u istom kadru: prethodna nepravda prema zajednici ne pretvara postrojenje automatski u štetan projekat, ali ni status „projekta od javnog interesa“ ne ukida obavezu transparentnosti i kontrole. [65][66][67]

TV Adria je protestima i protivnicima dala veliku vidljivost, ali je istovremeno objavila stavove gradonačelnika i ministra u prilog projektu, kao i informacije o ugovornoj dokumentaciji. Bez sistematske analize uzorka nije činjenično održivo tvrditi da je medij zbog političkog interesa bio protiv postrojenja. Održiva ocjena je uža: konfliktni naslovi i prenošenje stranačkih poruka mogu pojačati polarizaciju ako ih ne prate tehnička provjera, objašnjenje rizika i praćenje ugovorenih zaštitnih mjera. [65][66]

7. Studije slučaja i ostvareni rezultati

7.1. Male hidroelektrane: od lokalne odbrane do promjene nacionalne politike

Sukobi oko malih hidroelektrana predstavljaju jedan od najvažnijih primjera transformacije lokalnog ekološkog nezadovoljstva u nacionalno političko pitanje. Koncesioni model i sistem podsticaja omogućavali su razvoj projekata na malim vodotocima, dok su lokalne zajednice posljedice doživljavale kroz smanjenje protoka, promjene riječnih korita, pritisak na biodiverzitet i ugrožavanje vode kao resursa od neposrednog značaja za život i lokalnu ekonomiju.

Građanska mobilizacija nije nastala iz jedne centralne organizacije. Razvijala se kroz više lokalnih konflikata u kojima su se mještani organizovali oko zaštite rijeka koje neposredno koriste. Blokade, protesti i peticije obezbijedili su lokalnu mobilizaciju, dok su nevladine organizacije, pravnici i mediji omogućili da pojedinačni slučajevi budu povezani sa širim pitanjem koncesione politike i javnog interesa.

Važan element kampanje bilo je upravo povezivanje različitih uloga. Lokalno stanovništvo davalo je legitimitet i neposredna iskustva, stručne organizacije obezbjeđivale su analize i argumentaciju, pravna pomoć omogućavala je osporavanje odluka i ugovora, dok je kontinuirano medijsko izvještavanje pretvorilo niz lokalnih sukoba u političko pitanje nacionalnog značaja.

Od 2019. godine politika prema malim hidroelektranama počela je da se mijenja, a nakon promjene vlasti 2020. raskinuto je sedam ugovora i praktično je zaustavljeno odobravanje novih projekata. Time su lokalne kampanje proizvele rezultat koji prevazilazi pojedinačne rijeke: uticale su na način na koji država procjenjuje političku i društvenu prihvatljivost novih projekata.

Međutim, ovaj rezultat ne treba predstavljati kao konačno i nepovratno rješenje. Nije usvojena opšta zakonska zabrana svih malih hidroelektrana, a dio ranije započetih projekata i pravnih odnosa ostaje relevantan. Zato dugoročni uspjeh kampanje zavisi od trajnosti politike, načina rješavanja postojećih projekata i sposobnosti sistema da prije odobravanja budućih energetske zahvata procijeni kumulativni uticaj na rijeke i lokalne zajednice.

Najvažnija pouka ovog slučaja jeste da lokalna mobilizacija može promijeniti nacionalnu politiku kada se iskustvo ljudi neposredno pogođenih projektom poveže sa stručnim dokazima, pravnom podrškom i kontinuiranim javnim pritiskom.

Problem: koncesioni model i podsticaji omogućavali su projekte na malim rijekama uz visok lokalni ekološki trošak. Metod: blokade, peticije, pravna pomoć, mediji i koalicije lokalnih zajednica i NVO. Rezultat: politika se počela mijenjati 2019; poslije 2020. raskinuto je sedam ugovora i zaustavljeno novo odobravanje. Ograničenje: nije usvojena opšta zakonska zabrana, pa rezultat zavisi od trajnosti politike i postupanja po starim projektima. [11][12]

7.2. Morača i Bolje Sestre: snažna akcija, nedovršena kontrola

Problem: višegodišnja nelegalna eksploatacija riječnog nanosa i rad separacija u koritu i sanitarnoj zoni ugrozili su Moraču kao ekosistem i izvorište Bolje Sestre, od kojeg zavisi vodosnabdijevanje Crnogorskog primorja. Slučaj je istovremeno pitanje zaštite vode, nezakonite koristi, korupcije, institucionalne odgovornosti i bezbjednosti ljudi koji problem dokumentuju.

Građanska faza odgovora: Vuk Vujisić je tokom 2021. kao istraživački novinar objavljivao terenske nalaze o eksploataciji na Morači i Cijevni, nadležnima dostavljao dokazni materijal i održavao pritisak da se policija, inspekcije i tužilaštvo uključe. Vijesti su dokumentovale da je mjesecima pratio predmet, da su kontrole i hapšenja privremeno zaustavljali dio posla i da su ga ljudi povezani sa terenom javno označavali kao odgovornog za pokretanje policijske reakcije, uz prijetnje njemu i drugim novinarima. Monitor je 2022. zabilježio njegov iskaz da je dostavljanje dokaznog materijala vladinom timu prethodilo većoj policijskoj akciji. [72][73]

Institucionalna eskalacija: novi snimci koje je Vujisić objavio u januaru 2023. ušli su u nacionalnu medijsku i političku raspravu; on i Aleksandar Dragičević pozvani su na sjednicu Nacionalnog savjeta za borbu protiv korupcije. Tokom 43. Vlade sprovedene su međuresorne kontrole, rušenje nelegalnih objekata i pojačan nadzor, čime je rad više operatera zaustavljen i uklonjen dio infrastrukture. Ovaj slijed ne znači da je jedna osoba sama proizvela državnu odluku, ali potvrđuje da su istraživačko novinarstvo, terenski dokazi i kontinuirani aktivistički pritisak bili sastavni dio mehanizma koji je problem pretvorio u državni prioritet. [16][74]

Nedovršeni ishod: upozorenja iz 2024, oduzimanje ponovo korišćene mašine početkom 2026. i nalaz CIN-CG-a iz aprila 2026. da se na pojedinim lokacijama i dalje kopa pokazuju da blokada nije postala trajni sistem kontrole. Potrebni su konfiskacija mehanizacije i nezakonite koristi, finansijske istrage, odgovornost službenika koji omogućavaju povratak, trajno uklanjanje postrojenja iz zone zaštite i mjerljiv plan sanacije korita. [17][75][76]

7.3. Brskovo: lokalna zajednica, stručni argumenti i kontrola koncesione politike

Plan ponovnog otvaranja rudnika Brskovo kod Mojkovca otvorio je istovremeno ekološka, zdravstvena, ekonomska i institucionalna pitanja. Zagovornici projekta ukazivali su na mogućnost novih investicija i radnih mjesta, dok su građani i organizacije civilnog društva upozoravali na potencijalne posljedice rudarskog otpada, uticaj na vode, šume i zemljište, zdravstvene rizike i mogući uticaj na širi sliv Tare.

Zbog toga Brskovo nije bilo jednostavan konflikt između ekologije i ekonomskog razvoja. Ključno pitanje bilo je da li su dugoročni ekološki i zdravstveni rizici adekvatno procijenjeni i da li koncesioni odnos dovoljno štiti javni interes.

Građanska inicijativa Zdravi Mojkovac dala je lokalni legitimitet protivljenju projektu. Kampanja je uključivala proteste, javne nastupe i kontinuirano praćenje postupka, dok su stručne organizacije i predstavnici civilnog društva analizirali dokumentaciju i učestvovali u radu međuresorne komisije. Time je lokalni konflikt postepeno prerastao u pitanje kvaliteta koncesione politike i odgovornosti države prilikom dodjele prava na eksploataciju prirodnih resursa.

Važan element kampanje bilo je insistiranje da se odluka ne donosi isključivo na osnovu obećanog ekonomskog efekta, već da se u procjenu uključe mogući troškovi po zdravlje, vodu, zemljište, šume i dugoročnu razvojnu perspektivu Mojkovca.

Vlada Crne Gore je 30. maja 2024. raskinula koncesioni ugovor. To predstavlja jasan neposredni rezultat građanskog i stručnog pritiska, ali istovremeno otvara pitanje odgovornosti države za način na koji se koncesioni ugovori zaključuju. Arbitražna i ugovorna izloženost nakon raskida pokazuje da zaštita javnog interesa mora biti ugrađena u postupak prije zaključivanja ugovora, a ne tek kada konflikt već nastane.

Brskovo zato ima širi značaj od jednog rudarskog projekta. Slučaj pokazuje da se ekološka bezbjednost mora procjenjivati već prilikom planiranja i dodjele koncesije, kroz kvalitetne procjene uticaja, jasne zaštitne klauzule, transparentne podatke i stvarno učešće lokalne zajednice. U suprotnom država može biti dovedena u situaciju da bira između nastavka ekološki i društveno spornog projekta i značajnog pravnog i finansijskog rizika njegovog naknadnog raskidanja.

Problem: plan ponovnog otvaranja polimetaličnog rudnika, sa pitanjima otpada, vode, šuma, zdravlja i Tare. Metod: lokalni protesti, stručne analize, učešće NVO u komisiji i stalna javna kontrola. Rezultat: Vlada je 30. maja 2024. raskinula ugovor. Ograničenje: ugovorna i arbitražna izloženost države pokazuje da se zaštitne klauzule i procjena rizika moraju ugraditi prije dodjele koncesije. [34][35]

7.4. „Čuvaj da te čuva“: od kampanje ka infrastrukturi odgovornosti

Kampanju je Delegacija EU pokrenula 5. juna 2025. sa državnim i lokalnim institucijama, Eko-fondom, civilnim društvom, privredom, školama i medijima.

ČUVAJ.ME - Ozelenimo Crnu Goru razvilo je platformu Čuvaj.me sa Ministarstvom ekologije i EPA. Model kombinuje prijavu, terensku akciju, preventivnu infrastrukturu i institucionalnu koordinaciju. Po prvi

put građanin može anonimno da prijavi slučajeve ekoloških prekršaja i ekokriminala i da prati ishod slučaja i postupanja nadležnih inspekcija sa sve dokumentima inspekcijskih nadzora a da isti ne morau da znaju nadležnosti službi i inspekcija. Od 5.06.2025 godine prijavljeno je 504 slučajeve dok je 152 riješeno. Slučaji se najviše sastoje od slučajeva divljih deponija i nelegalnog odlaganja otpada i to u 205 slučajeva dok je pristan i veliki broj slučajeva paljenja guma, otpadnih voda i nelegalne eksploatacije šljunka, kamena i šuma [18]

Nelegalna odlagališta - u sklopu kampanje saniraju se

Kampanja je ostvarila više od komunikacije: otvorila je kanal za prijave, pomogla formiranje specijalizovanih struktura i povezala čišćenje sa nadzorom. Ipak, izvještavanje je još dominantno o aktivnostima. [19][20][21][41][42][43]

7.5. Ulcinjska solana: dugoročni monitoring kao politička snaga

Solana pokazuje vrijednost istrajnosti i međunarodnog povezivanja. Zatvaranje proizvodnje soli i promjene vlasničko-upravljačkog okvira ugrozile su vodni režim i stanište od evropskog značaja. CZIP je godinama povezivao brojanje ptica, obnovu infrastrukture, javne kampanje, pravne inicijative i saradnju sa BirdLife mrežom, Bernskom konvencijom i evropskim institucijama. Time je lokalni prostor postao indikator vjerodostojnosti crnogorske politike zaštite prirode. [22][23]

Zaštitni status i međunarodna pažnja jesu važni rezultati, ali nijesu završetak slučaja. Evropska komisija i 2025. traži održivo upravljanje Solanom. Ključni testovi su stabilan upravljač, budžet, održavanje pumpi i nasipa, stručni monitoring i model koji povezuje biodiverzitet sa održivim lokalnim razvojem. Pouka je da kampanja može dobiti odluku, a ipak izgubiti stanište ako nema novca i odgovornosti za svakodnevno upravljanje. [2][23]

7.6. Komarnica: stručna koalicija i granica proceduralne pobjede

Kampanja za Komarnicu spojila je terenska istraživanja CDE-a i partnera, podršku Green Homea i CZIP-a, lokalne ljubitelje prirode i međunarodnu stručnu zajednicu. Više od 200 naučnika i stručnjaka i preko 20 domaćih NVO upozorili su 2025. na biodiverzitet, kumulativne uticaje i proceduralne slabosti. EPCG je potom privremeno povukao elaborat radi dopune. To je važan zastoj projekta, ali ne i odluka o zaštiti kanjona. [36][45][46]

Komarnica razotkriva čestu zamjenu teza: rasprava se sužava na pitanje da li je jedan elaborat dovoljno dopunjen, umjesto da se prvo utvrdi da li je gubitak kanjona prihvatljiv, koje su energetske alternative i koliki je kumulativni uticaj sa postojećim zahvatima. Uspjeh kampanje zato treba mjeriti konačnom odlukom o prostoru i energiji, ne samo vraćanjem dokumenta na doradu.

7.7. Sinjajevina: kada se ekološka i bezbjednosna politika sudare

Sinjajevina nije spor o „NATO bazi“, već o vojnom poligonu na prostoru koji lokalni stočari koriste kao zajednički pašnjak i koji ima visoke prirodne i kulturne vrijednosti. Inicijativa Sačuvajmo Sinjajevinu povezala je katune, hranu, vodu, biodiverzitet i pravo zajednice da učestvuje u odluci o zemljištu od kojeg zavisi. Podrška domaćih NVO i međunarodnih mreža omogućila je da lokalni konflikt uđe u evropsko izvještavanje. [2][40]

Ovaj slučaj pokazuje da se ekološka bezbjednost ne može podrediti uskom razumijevanju bezbjednosti. Odgovor mora istovremeno procijeniti odbrambene potrebe, ekosistemske usluge, egzistenciju stočara, alternativne lokacije i procedure odlučivanja. Privremeno odsustvo vježbi nije trajno rješenje; Evropska komisija i dalje očekuje adekvatan institucionalni ishod, a proces zaštite je još u toku. [2]

7.8. Šta su kampanje dokazale — kao i sa kojim se rizicima suočavaju

Slučaj	Dokazani rezultat	Preostali sistemski rizik
MHE	Promjena politike, raskid sedam ugovora i praktično zaustavljanje novih odobrenja kroz moratorijum donešen u Skupštini Crne Gore	Stari projekti i moguća buduća promjena politika
Morača/Šljunak	Rušenje objekata i zaustavljanje dijela eksploatacije ugradnja efikasnog video nadzora	Povratak eksploatacije u predizbornom periodu zbog socijalnog mira i priliva - fragmentisan nadzor ugrožen korupcijom
Brskovo	Raskid koncesionog ugovora 2024.	Arbitražna izloženost i mogućnost ponavljanja slabih ugovornih zaštita
Ulcinjaska solana	Zaštita, međunarodna vidljivost i dugoročni podaci	Nedovršeno održivo upravljanje i finansiranje formiranog preduzeća
Komarnica	Privremeno povlačenje elaborata i široka stručna koalicija	Projekat nije trajno zaustavljen niti je kanjon trajno zaštićen još se HE Komarnica nalazi u adokumentima
Sinjajevina	Mobilizacija zajednice i evropska pažnja	Nema konačnog rješenja statusa vojnog poligona osim odluka Vlade koje su promjenjiva, status zaštite Sinjajevine nije sproveden do kraja
Čuvaj da te čuva	Prijavna platforma, akcije i specijalizovane institucionalne strukture	Održivost akcija zavisi od spremnosti sistema da da kontinuirano radi na slučajevima

7.9. Šta određuje uspjeh ekološke kampanje

Poređenje analiziranih slučajeva pokazuje da uspješne ekološke kampanje u Crnoj Gori rijetko zavise od jednog aktera ili jedne metode djelovanja. Najznačajniji rezultati nastaju kada se povežu najmanje četiri elementa: lokalni legitimitet, stručni i terenski dokazi, javna mobilizacija i kontinuirano pravno-institucionalno praćenje.

Lokalna zajednica kampanji daje neposredni legitimitet i znanje o prostoru. Stručne organizacije omogućavaju da se lokalna zabrinutost prevede na jezik biologije, ekologije, prava, ekonomije i javnih politika. Mediji i javne kampanje povećavaju političku cijenu ignorisanja problema, dok pravnici, organizacije civilnog društva i aktivisti omogućavaju da predmet ne završi sa protestom ili medijskim naslovom, već da uđe u upravni, inspeksijski, tužilački ili politički proces.

Sinjajevina pokazuje snagu povezivanja lokalne zajednice, javne mobilizacije, naučne podrške i međunarodne vidljivosti. Komarnica pokazuje značaj stručnih istraživanja i široke koalicije. Brskovo pokazuje kako se lokalno protivljenje može povezati sa stručnim analizama i praćenjem koncesionog odnosa. Borba protiv malih hidroelektrana pokazuje sposobnost više lokalnih zajednica da pojedinačne konflikte pretvore u pitanje nacionalne politike, dok slučaj Morače pokazuje koliko su važni dugotrajno terensko dokumentovanje i institucionalni pritisak kada se problem odnosi na organizovanu eksploataciju prirodnih resursa.

Istovremeno, ovi slučajevi pokazuju da uspjeh ne treba definisati samo kao trenutak kada je određeni projekat zaustavljen. Ekološka kampanja može ostvariti više vrsta rezultata.

Neposredni rezultat postoji kada se zaustavi štetna aktivnost, povuče elaborat, raskine ugovor ili spriječi konkretna intervencija u prostoru. Institucionalni rezultat nastaje kada kampanja dovede do nove procedure, jačeg nadzora, formiranja specijalizovanog tijela ili drugačijeg postupanja nadležnih organa.

Politički rezultat postoji kada jedan lokalni problem dovede do promjene šire javne politike, kao što se dogodilo sa malim hidroelektranama. Društveni rezultat nastaje kada kampanja ojača lokalnu zajednicu,

proizvede nove podatke, poveže organizacije koje ranije nijesu sarađivale ili uključi nove građane u zaštitu javnog interesa.

Zbog toga odluka kojom se projekat privremeno zaustavlja ne mora predstavljati konačnu pobjedu. Komarnica pokazuje razliku između proceduralnog zastoja i trajne zaštite prostora. Ulcinjska solana pokazuje da formalna zaštita nema punu vrijednost bez stabilnog upravljanja i finansiranja. Morača pokazuje da snažna institucionalna akcija može dati rezultat, ali da se problem može vratiti ukoliko nadzor nije trajan.

Najveća slabost kampanja pojavljuje se upravo nakon prvog uspjeha. Medijska pažnja opada, finansiranje se završava, institucije mijenjaju rukovodstvo, a dio aktivista prelazi na druge probleme. Zbog toga je dugoročno praćenje izvršenja odluka jednako važno kao i sama kampanja koja je do odluke dovela.

Analizirani slučajevi zato ukazuju da održivi model ekološkog aktivizma nije model u kojem civilno društvo trajno zamjenjuje institucije. Njegova funkcija je da otkrije problem, obezbijedi javni i stručni nadzor, zastupa interes pogođenih zajednica i zahtijeva odgovornost. Trajni rezultat postoji tek kada institucije preuzmu svoju zakonsku ulogu i kada rješavanje problema više ne zavisi od kontinuirane lične izloženosti aktivista.

Od sanacije do prevencije

ČUVAJ DA TE ČUVA



Uklanjanje otpada i praćenje prostora.



8. Pritisaci, rizici i potrebe aktivista

Pritisak se ne svodi samo na fizičku prijetnju. Intervjui i javni slučajevi pokazuju čitav lanac: uskraćivanje ili zakašnjelo dostavljanje dokumenata; formalne javne rasprave bez obrazloženja; političko etiketiranje; rodno i generacijsko podcjenjivanje; odavanje ličnih podataka; prijetnje tužbom; terensko zastrašivanje; digitalni napadi; finansijska nesigurnost; i pregovaranje.

Andrijana Mićanović opisuje podrugivanje i umanjivanje stručnog autoriteta mladih žena. Ivana Čogurić Rašović govori o psihološkom oporavku poslije postupka i povredi povjerenja kada je identitet prijaviteljke otkriven prijavljenom licu. Miloš Gezović navodi ozbiljne prijetnje i potrebu za institucionalnom zaštitom. Miodrag Vujović opisuje dugotrajno administrativno iscrpljivanje i krivičnu prijavu kao teret organizaciji. Vuk Vujisić naglašava bezbjednosne rizike ljudi koji dokumentuju ekološki kriminal i koji se suočavaju sa prijetnjama i aktivnostima koje ugrožavaju bezbjednost aktivista..

SLAPP zaštita mora obuhvatiti ranu procjenu i brzo odbacivanje zloupotrebljavajućih tužbi, troškove postupka i podršku tuženom. EU Direktiva 2024/1069 pokriva prekogranične građanske predmete, dok Preporuka Savjeta Evrope CM/Rec(2024)2 daje širi okvir. Crna Gora treba domaći mehanizam koji štiti aktiviste, novinare, naučnike i lokalne zajednice i u čisto domaćim predmetima. [37][38]

Iskustva sagovornika pokazuju da se rizici sa kojima se suočavaju ekološki aktivisti u Crnoj Gori ne mogu svesti samo na direktne fizičke prijetnje. Pritisak se pojavljuje u različitim fazama aktivističkog rada: od pokušaja da se dođe do informacija, preko prijavljivanja nepravilnosti i učešća u javnim raspravama, do medijskog istupanja, sudskih postupaka i dugotrajnog praćenja institucionalnog odgovora. Zbog toga bezbjednost aktivista treba razumjeti šire – kao kombinaciju fizičke, pravne, institucionalne, digitalne, finansijske i psihološke bezbjednosti.

8.1. Administrativno iscrpljivanje i ograničen pristup institucijama

Jedan od najčešćih oblika pritiska nije otvorena prijetnja, već dugotrajno administrativno iscrpljivanje. Aktivisti i organizacije moraju slati zahtjeve za pristup informacijama, urgencije, prijave i ponovljene dopise kako bi dobili dokumentaciju ili informaciju o tome da li je institucija uopšte postupala. Takav model prebacuje dio tereta nadzora sa institucija na građane i civilno društvo.

Miodrag Vujović iz KOD-a upravo ukazuje na problem dugotrajnog praćenja predmeta i činjenicu da formalno postojanje javne rasprave, radne grupe ili mogućnosti podnošenja primjedbi ne znači nužno i stvarno učešće javnosti. Ako institucija ne objasni zašto je određen komentar odbijen, ne navede rokove i ne omogući praćenje izvršenja, participacija ostaje formalna.

Takvi procesi zahtijevaju vrijeme, ljude i pravnu podršku. Za organizacije sa malim timovima svaki višemjesečni ili višegodišnji predmet znači da dio ograničenih kapaciteta mora biti trajno vezan za administrativno praćenje jednog problema.

Ovaj problem naglasila je i Andrijana Mićanović u slučaju projekta HE Komarnica gdje je trebalo vremena kako bi se sve informacije objelodanile, ali i dalje nemamo ključnu informaciju da li je država zista odustala od ovog projekta i šta kao građani dobijamo a šta dajemo u odnosu na aktuelne ugovore.

8.2. Pravne procedure kao mehanizam zaštite, ali i potencijalnog pritiska

Pravni sistem predstavlja osnovni mehanizam kroz koji aktivisti mogu tražiti zaštitu javnog interesa, ali pravni postupci istovremeno mogu postati izvor pritiska kada se koriste prvenstveno za iscrpljivanje ili odvratanje od javnog djelovanja.

Iskustvo Ivane Čogurić Rašović koja se suočila sa tužbom od strane lokalnih institucija zbog svog aktivističkog čina pokazuje da i postupak koji na kraju ne dovede do sankcije može proizvesti ozbiljne posljedice po aktivistu. Vrijeme provedeno u postupku, potreba za pravnom pomoći, neizvjesnost i osjećaj izloženosti mogu imati odvratajući efekat na buduće prijavljivanje problema. Posebno ozbiljan problem predstavlja povreda povjerljivosti kada identitet ili lični podaci podnosioca prijave postanu dostupni licu na koje se prijava odnosi.

Zbog toga zaštita od SLAPP postupaka ne treba da se ograniči samo na konačni sudski ishod. Potrebni su rana procjena da li postupak ima karakter zloupotrebe prava, brza pravna pomoć, mogućnost ranog odbacivanja očigledno neosnovanih zahtjeva i zaštita aktiviste od nesrazmjernih troškova postupka.

8.3. Prijetnje i bezbjednosni rizici na terenu

Poseban nivo rizika postoji kada aktivisti dokumentuju aktivnosti koje mogu donositi značajnu nezakonitu ekonomsku korist. Nelegalna eksploatacija prirodnih resursa, bespravna gradnja, nelegalna sječa, odlaganje otpada ili drugi oblici ekološkog kriminala često podrazumijevaju neposredno terensko prisustvo, fotografisanje, snimanje i identifikovanje odgovornih aktera.

Miloš Gezović u intervjuu govori o ozbiljnim prijetnjama povezanim sa javnim angažmanom i potrebi da zaštita aktivista ne zavisi isključivo od njihove lične procjene rizika. Iskustva dokumentovanja eksploatacije šljunka na Morači i Cijevni takođe pokazuju da javno prepoznatljiva osoba koja kontinuirano prati ekološki kriminal može postati lično izložena pritiscima i prijetnjama.

Problem je posebno izražen kada jedna osoba istovremeno prikuplja dokaze, komunicira sa građanima, kontaktira policiju i inspekcije, nastupa u medijima i postaje javno lice kampanje. U tom slučaju ugrožavanje jednog aktiviste može ugroziti i kontinuitet cijelog predmeta.

Zbog toga je potreban jasan bezbjednosni protokol za aktiviste koji rade na rizičnim slučajevima: kontakt-tačka u policiji, mogućnost brze procjene rizika, sigurno dostavljanje dokaza, evidentiranje prijetnji i jasna povratna informacija o postupanju nadležnih organa.

8.4. Političko etiketiranje, javna diskreditacija i nejednak položaj

Pritisak ne mora biti pravne ili fizičke prirode. Javno etiketiranje aktivista kao protivnika razvoja, političkih aktera ili osoba koje navodno djeluju protiv interesa lokalne zajednice može smanjiti legitimnost njihovog rada i povećati ličnu izloženost.

Intervjui ukazuju i na rodnu i generacijsku dimenziju problema. Andrijana Mićanović opisuje iskustva u kojima se stručni autoritet mlađih žena umanjuje ili se njihove intervencije tretiraju sa manje ozbiljnosti. Takvi oblici ponašanja teško se evidentiraju klasičnim bezbjednosnim indikatorima, ali utiču na kvalitet učešća u javnim procesima i spremnost pojedinaca da ostanu aktivni.

Institucionalna zaštita zato ne treba da se aktivira tek kada postoji eksplicitna prijetnja. Potrebno je stvarati kulturu u kojoj su kritika, prijava nepravilnosti i osporavanje razvojnih projekata legitimni oblici demokratskog učešća, a ne dokaz neprijateljstva prema institucijama ili ekonomskom razvoju.

8.5. Finansijska nesigurnost i zavisnost od pojedinaca

Jedan od manje vidljivih, ali sistemski značajnih rizika predstavlja način finansiranja ekološkog aktivizma. Mnogi predmeti traju znatno duže od jednog projektnog ciklusa. Sudski, upravni ili inspekcijski postupak može trajati nekoliko godina, dok projekat organizacije traje šest mjeseci ili godinu.

Kada finansiranje prestane, ne prestaje i ekološki problem. Međutim, organizacija može ostati bez osobe koja prati predmet, pravne pomoći ili sredstava za terenski rad. Na taj način institucionalno pamćenje ostaje vezano za pojedinca umjesto za sistem.

Sličan problem postoji kod neformalnih lokalnih inicijativa. One često imaju najveći legitimitet jer ih čine ljudi neposredno pogođeni projektom ili degradacijom prostora, ali istovremeno imaju najmanje finansijskih, stručnih i pravnih kapaciteta. Zato podrška lokalnim inicijativama ne treba da znači njihovo preuzimanje od strane većih NVO, već obezbjeđivanje ekspertize, pravne pomoći, malih hitnih grantova i infrastrukture za dugoročno praćenje predmeta.

8.6. Psihološko opterećenje i “pregorijevanje”

Dugotrajni konflikt sa institucijama, kompanijama ili lokalnim političkim i ekonomskim interesima može proizvesti ozbiljno psihološko opterećenje. Aktivisti rade u malim timovima, često van standardnog radnog vremena, reaguju na prijave građana i paralelno pokušavaju da finansiraju svoj rad.

Ivana Čogurić Rašović govori o potrebi za psihološkim oporavkom nakon postupaka kojima je bila izložena. Takva iskustva pokazuju da posljedice aktivizma nijesu ograničene na period neposrednog konflikta. Strah, iscrpljenost i gubitak povjerenja u institucije mogu dugoročno uticati na spremnost osobe da ponovo prijavi problem ili javno nastupi.

Psihološka podrška zato ne treba da se tretira kao privatno pitanje pojedinca, već kao dio održivosti civilnog društva. Povjerljivo savjetovanje, mogućnost privremenog povlačenja iz intenzivnog rada i raspodjela odgovornosti unutar organizacija mogu smanjiti zavisnost kampanja od nekoliko najizloženijih pojedinaca.

8.7. Šta je potrebno da bi aktivizam bio bezbjedniji i održiviji

Analiza intervjua pokazuje da aktivistima nije potrebna samo deklarativna podrška. Potrebna je infrastruktura koja omogućava da osoba koja ukaže na problem ne ostane sama nakon što slučaj postane konfliktan.

To podrazumijeva dostupnu hitnu pravnu pomoć, funkcionalan mehanizam zaštite od SLAPP postupaka, policijsku kontakt-tačku za rizične slučajeve, bezbjedne digitalne kanale za dostavljanje dokaza, zaštitu ličnih podataka prijavitelja, psihološku podršku i višegodišnje programe osnovnog finansiranja organizacija koje prate dugotrajne predmete.

Jednako je važna generacijska obnova. Prepoznatljivost nekoliko aktivista može pomoći mobilizaciji i medijskoj vidljivosti, ali sistem koji zavisi od nekoliko ljudi ostaje ranjiv. Održivi ekološki pokret zahtijeva nove stručnjake, lokalne koordinate, komunikatore, pravnike, istraživače i mlade aktiviste, kao i zajedničke baze podataka koje omogućavaju da informacije o jednom predmetu ne nestanu kada se promijeni projekat, organizacija ili osoba koja ga vodi.

Zbog toga dugoročna zaštita ekoloških aktivista nije samo pitanje zaštite pojedinca. Ona je pitanje sposobnosti društva da pravovremeno identifikuje ekološki rizik, dokumentuje ga i zahtijeva odgovornost institucija. Kada aktivisti zbog prijetnji, finansijskog iscrpljivanja ili dugotrajnih postupaka odustanu od rada, država gubi važan mehanizam ranog upozoravanja i javnog nadzora.

Potreba	Zašto je hitna	Predloženi mehanizam
Hitna pravna pomoć	Rokovi teku odmah nakon prijetnje ili tužbe i potrebno je brzo djelovanje	24/7 kontakt, fond za advokata i ranu procjenu SLAPP-a
Bezbjednosni protokol	Terenski rad otkriva profitabilne nezakonite aktivnosti i često podrazumijeva prijetnje i čak fizičku ugroženost	Kontakt tačka u policiji, procjena rizika, čuvanje dokaza
Digitalna zaštita	Gubitak podataka i nadzor mogu otkriti izvore, a privatni podaci mogu koristiti za ucjene	Obuke, sigurni kanali, uređaji i odgovor na incident
Psihološka podrška	Hronični konflikt i mali timovi vode psihološkom “pregorijevanju”	Povjerljivo savjetovanje, supervizija i odmor
Osnovno finansiranje kroz generalne podrške	Predmeti traju duže od projektnog ciklusa	Višegodišnji institucionalni grantovi i fond za hitne slučajeve
Generacijska obnova	Nekolicina ljudi nosi većinu tereta	Mentorstvo, akademije stipendije i rad sa školama/mladima
Koordinacija resursima i djelovanjem	Podaci i resursi ostaju u zatvorenim krugovima	Zajednički registar slučajeva, kalendar kampanja i podjela uloga

9. Preporuke

Nalazi istraživanja pokazuju da unapređenje ekološke bezbjednosti ne zavisi prvenstveno od donošenja novih propisa, već od njihove dosljedne implementacije, jasne odgovornosti institucija i uključivanja građana i ekoloških organizacija u odlučivanje u upravljanju prirodnih resursa.

9.1. Jasno utvrditi nadležnosti institucija

Potrebno je uspostaviti obavezujući protokol za postupanje u slučajevima ekoloških incidenata i sumnje na ekološki kriminal. Protokol treba da odredi nadležnu instituciju, rokove za kontrolu i obavezu saradnje policije, tužilaštva, inspekcija i lokalnih uprava. Podnosioci prijava treba da budu obaviješteni o izvršenoj kontroli, utvrđenom stanju i preduzetim mjerama kao kroz nacionalnu platformu Čuvaj.me ali to mora postati obavezujuće za inspekcijske organe i službenike kao što stoji u zakonu a ne volja inspekciojskog službenika.

9.2. Ojačati borbu protiv ekološkog kriminala

Specijalizovane jedinice policije i tužilaštva potrebno je ojačati dodatnim službenicima, opremom i stručnim obukama. Istrage ne treba ograničiti na neposredne izvršioce, već njima obuhvatiti vlasnike mehanizacije, pravna lica, tokove novca i eventualnu odgovornost službenih osoba. U ponovljenim slučajevima nelegalne eksploatacije treba omogućiti brzo oduzimanje mehanizacije i imovinske koristi i na taj način odvratiti prestupnike od činjenja ovih prekršaja i krivičnih djela protiv životne sredine.

9.3. Unaprijediti inspekcijski nadzor

Inspekcijama je potrebno obezbijediti dovoljan broj zaposlenih, terenska vozila, tehničku opremu i mogućnost nenajavljenih kontrola van redovnog radnog vremena. Kontrole treba usmjeravati prema procjeni rizika i ranijim prijavama, uz obaveznu provjeru izvršenja donesenih rješenja. Potrebno je uspostaviti jedinstvenu evidenciju nadzora, izrečenih mjera i njihovog sprovođenja uvezanih sa ostalim organima poput Uprave policije i Državnog tužilaštva.

9.4. Obezbijediti sanaciju ekološke štete

Institucionalni odgovor ne smije se završiti podnošenjem prijave ili izricanjem kazne. U svakom slučaju u kojem je utvrđena šteta potrebno je odrediti njen obim, način sanacije, rokove i odgovornog izvršioca. Troškove obnove prvenstveno treba da snosi odgovorni subjekt, u skladu sa principom „zagađivač plaća“ što je unaprijeđeno novim zakonskim rješenjima.

9.5. Uključiti ekološke rizike u razvojno planiranje

Strateške procjene uticaja na životnu sredinu moraju prethoditi donošenju investicionih i planskih odluka i moraju prethoditi koncesionim planovima i zaključivanju koncesionih ugovora, a ne služiti samo kao formalna potvrda već odabranog projekta. Posebno treba procjenjivati zbirni uticaj više projekata na obali, u riječnim koritima, šumskim kompleksima, zaštićenim područjima i zonama vodosnabdijevanja. Javnost i lokalne zajednice moraju biti uključene dovoljno rano da mogu stvarno uticati na odluke.

9.6. Utvrditi sektorske prioritete

U oblasti voda prioriteta su izgradnja sistema za prečišćavanje otpadnih voda, zaštita izvorišta i suzbijanje nelegalne eksploatacije šljunka. U šumarstvu su potrebni bolja kontrola porijekla drveta i korišćenje satelitskog nadzora. Upravljanje otpadom treba usmjeriti na sprječavanje nastanka otpada, odvajanje, reciklažu i rješavanje problema guma, građevinskog i opasnog otpada. U oblastima kvaliteta vazduha i energetike potrebno je smanjivati zavisnost od uglja i obezbijediti pravovremeno informisanje stanovništva o zdravstvenim rizicima.

9.7. Zaštititi ekološke aktiviste i novinare

Prijetnje, pritisci i kampanje diskreditacije protiv aktivista i novinara moraju biti brzo i djelotvorno istraženi. Institucije treba da unaprijede kontakt-tačke za komunikaciju sa ekološkim organizacijama i omoguće im bezbjedno dostavljanje dokaza kao kroz platformu Čuvaj.me i novu digitalnu platformu Uprave policije. Potrebno je spriječiti zloupotrebu sudskih postupaka čiji je cilj zastrašivanje i iscrpljivanje osoba koje djeluju u javnom interesu, a naročito u slučajevima SLAPP tužbi.

9.8. Obezbijediti stabilnu podršku građanskom djelovanju

Ekološke organizacije često obavljaju dugotrajan terenski rad, dokumentuju probleme i prate postupanje institucija, ali se uglavnom oslanjaju na kratkoročne projekte. Potrebno je obezbijediti transparentne programe generalne podrške za terenski monitoring, pravnu pomoć, stručne analize i razvoj lokalnih inicijativa, uz očuvanje nezavisnosti organizacija od državnih institucija i donatora.

Mjera	Nosilac
Javni registar ekoloških prijava, predmeta, sankcija, štete i sanacije	MERS, EPA, VDT, UP, inspekcije
Operativni protokol policija–tužilaštvo–inspekcije sa oduzimanjem mehanizacije i finansijskim istragama	VDT i UP
Jačanje inspekcija po mapiranom regionalnom riziku	Vlada i nadležni resori
Plan pravedne tranzicije Pljevalja sa namjenskim fondom	Vlada, Opština, Eko-fond, EPCG/RUP
Lokalni planovi otpada, selekcija na izvoru i objavljivanje toka guma/plastike	Opštine i MERS
Trajna zaštita ključnih rijeka i kanjona prije energetske odluke	Vlada, EPA, Skupština
Nacionalni anti-SLAPP i protokol zaštite aktivista/prijavitelja	Ministarstvo pravde, MUP, sudstvo
Višegodišnji osnovni grantovi i hitni fond za aktiviste	Donatori, Eko-fond i MJU
Standard učešća javnosti: 30 dana, objavljeni komentari i obrazloženi odgovori	Svi resori i opštine
Transparentnost ekološkog medijskog sadržaja: oznaka plaćenog sadržaja, finansiranih putovanja i sukoba interesa	Mediji, AMU i samoregulatorna tijela
Nezavisna godišnja evaluacija „Čuvaj da te čuva“ i Čuvaj.me	Delegacija EU i partneri

10. Zaključak

Nalazi ovog istraživanja pokazuju da ekološka bezbjednost u Crnoj Gori nije samo pitanje zaštite prirode, već i javnog zdravlja, ekonomskog razvoja, bezbjednosti zajednica i vladavine prava. Zagađenje vazduha i voda, nelegalna eksploatacija šljunka i šuma, neadekvatno upravljanje otpadom, bespravna gradnja i pritisci na zaštićena područja nijesu međusobno odvojeni problemi. Naprotiv oni ukazuju na slabosti sistema upravljanja prostorom i prirodnim resursima, u kojem postoji izražen raskorak između propisa i njihove implementacije.

Istraživanje potvrđuje da su ekološki aktivisti, lokalne inicijative, nevladine organizacije i istraživački novinari imali važnu ulogu u otkrivanju problema, prikupljanju dokaza, obavještanju javnosti i pokretanju institucionalnih reakcija. Slučajevi zaštite rijeka od malih hidroelektrana, nelegalne eksploatacije šljunka na Morači i ugrožavanja izvorišta Bolje Sestre, planiranog rudnika Brskovo i druge lokalne kampanje pokazuju da organizovano građansko djelovanje može uticati na odluke i zaustaviti ili ograničiti štetne projekte. Istovremeno, ovi primjeri otkrivaju da reakcija institucija često dolazi tek nakon dugotrajnog javnog pritiska i uloženi resursa od strane civilnog sektora.

Takvo stanje nije održivo. Aktivisti ne mogu trajno preuzimati uloge inspekcije, istražnih organa i drugih institucija, niti njihova lična izloženost smije biti uslov za sprovođenje zakona. Država mora obezbijediti pravovremenu kontrolu, djelotvorne istrage, odgovornost počinilaca, oduzimanje nezakonito stečene koristi i sanaciju nastale štete. Civilno društvo pritom treba da zadrži nezavisnu ulogu nadzora, ukazivanja na propuste i zastupanja interesa građana i lokalnih zajednica.

Formiranje specijalizovanih kapaciteta za borbu protiv ekološkog kriminala, veća dostupnost digitalnih alata za prijavljivanje problema i snažnije povezivanje institucija predstavljaju važne pomake. Međutim, njihov uspjeh neće se mjeriti brojem formiranih tijela, održanih sastanaka, podnesenih prijava, broja inspekcijskih nadzora već konkretnim rezultatima: smanjenjem zagađenja, smanjenjem ponavljanja krivičnih djela iz domena zaštite životne sredine, transparentnijim i kraćim postupcima, većim brojem saniranih lokacija, dostupnijim podacima i boljom zaštitom ljudi koji prijavljuju štetu.

Crna Gora će ustavno opredjeljenje ekološke države pretvoriti u stvarnost tek kada zaštita životne sredine postane redova i mjerljiva obaveza institucija, a ne rezultat upornosti i ličnog rizika organizacija i pojedinaca.

Izvori

Brojevi u uglastim zagradama u tekstu upućuju na sljedeće javne izvore. Intervjui su navedeni odvojeno na kraju.

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- Odgovori i radne bilješke Vuka Vujisića (Ozelenimo Crnu Goru), jun–jul 2026.
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Environmental Security in Montenegro



Current Conditions, Actors, Pressures and Recommendations

Vuk Vujisić

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Contents

Executive Summary and Key Findings	39
1. Introduction: The Ecological State in the Post-Yugoslav Transition.....	40
2. A Crisis in Natural Resource Governance	41
3. Domestic and International Context.....	43
4. The Environment and Human Security	45
5. Environmental Crime and the Institutional Response	48
6. The Environmental Movement: Organisations, Initiatives and Activists.....	49
7. Case Studies and Results	58
8. Pressures, Risks and Activists' Needs	64
9. Recommendations	67
10. Conclusion	69
Sources.....	70

Executive Summary and Key Findings

Montenegro's principal problem is not a lack of environmental rules, but the way natural resources are governed and those rules enforced. Its constitutional status as an ecological state and progress under Chapter 27 have yet to deliver consistent protection of land, water, air, forests and biodiversity. The central risk arises from the combination of a development policy that treats land and resources as commodities for short-term gain, fragmented responsibilities, understaffed and weak inspection services, selective enforcement and limited accountability for damage. The consequences extend beyond the environment: they include harm to health, substantial economic losses, the loss of clean water and land, pressure on tourism and agriculture, migration and declining trust in institutions. [1][2]

Data for 2024 and 2025 illustrate the scale of the problem. In 2024, the daily PM10 limit was exceeded on 95 days in Pljevlja and 103 days in Bijelo Polje, compared with the permitted 35. Only seven of the 30 river sites assessed met the required overall water quality status. Of the 375,252 tonnes of municipal waste treated, 91.6% was disposed of, while approximately 0.27% underwent material recycling. In 2025, the State Prosecution Service handled criminal complaints concerning 527 individuals for offences against the environment and spatial planning; complaints concerning 225 individuals remained unresolved at the end of the year. [3][4][14]

At the same time, civic resistance has brought tangible change. Campaigns against small hydropower plants turned local river protection into a national political issue and helped bring about a de facto halt to new approvals and the termination of seven contracts after the change of government in 2020. A citizens' initiative in Mojkovac, supported by experts and NGOs, contributed to the termination of the Brskovo mining concession in 2024. Since 2020, the campaign to protect the Bolje Sestre spring and the Morača River has, for the first time, prompted the state to "declare war on the construction mafia", resulting in the arrest of powerful company owners and the demolition of their illegal aggregate processing facilities within the water source protection zone. The campaign to protect Velika Plaža united civil society and brought the agreement with the United Arab Emirates and Eagle Hills' planned projects into the national debate. The "Čuvaj da te čuva" ("Protect It So It Protects You") campaign linked field activities with digital reporting and institutional change, building systems and strengthening institutions through monitoring by civil society and EU representatives. These successes remain fragile, however, until they become lasting rules, systemic solutions and sustained, measurable outcomes. [11][16][18][20]

- Environmental security must be treated as human security: health, water, food, housing, work and resilience to fires, droughts and floods.
- Environmental crime requires financial investigations and the tracing of criminal proceeds, as well as action to address its consequences on the ground.
- Civil society is diverse. Specialist NGOs, local initiatives, informal networks, youth movements, journalists and individual activists have different resources, face different risks and therefore have different needs.
- The environmental movement's greatest weakness is not a lack of ideas, but a small pool of people, short-term funding, exhausting administrative procedures, threats to personal safety and burnout.
- The institutional advances made in 2025–2026 will endure only if staffing gaps are filled and services receive appropriate equipment, a central public case register, defined deadlines and clearly measurable targets.

1. Introduction: The Ecological State in the Post-Yugoslav Transition

Montenegro adopted the Declaration on the Ecological State in Žabljak on 20 September 1991 and subsequently incorporated this commitment into its constitutional order. The Declaration was adopted during the final phase of Yugoslav socialism and at the beginning of a profound political, economic and institutional transformation, initially accompanied by war and economic crises. The development of the ecological state concept therefore cannot be analysed outside the post-Yugoslav and post-communist context, which involved changes in statehood, market transition, privatisation, deindustrialisation in certain areas and the establishment of new concession and spatial governance models. [1][70]

This historical context partly explains the gap between a strong symbolic commitment and weaker institutional practice, and the resulting condition of natural resources and land. Following the privatisation of socially owned industry, natural resources became important economic and political assets. Meanwhile, inspection services, local authorities, data systems and accountability mechanisms remained fragmented or insufficiently robust, both in capacity and in their resistance to the corruption that persists in Montenegro's institutions. The concepts of post-Yugoslav and post-communist transition are not used here as universal explanations for every problem, but as an analytical framework for understanding the continuing industrial legacy, ownership changes and the emergence of new private interests in the management of water, forests, the coast, minerals and land.

The research addresses four questions: which environmental problems pose the greatest threats to citizens and communities; why these problems arise and where institutions fail to prevent or resolve them; who makes up the environmental movement and how it operates; and what support activists and organisations need to protect the public interest over the long term, including the institutional reforms required to build a system that resists corruption and resolves environmental problems effectively.

1.1. Methodological Note

The analysis combines: (1) official data from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), MONSTAT, the European Commission, the State Prosecution Service, the Ministry of the Interior and the Energy Community; (2) legal and policy analyses; (3) organisational reports and relevant media investigations; and (4) four in-depth interviews with Miodrag Vujović (KOD), Andrijana Mićanović (Montenegrin Ecologists Society), Ivana Čogurić Rašović (Ecopatriotizam) and Miloš Gezović (Ljute Kamilice/Heal Boka Bay). Public sources cover the period up to and including 31 July 2026.

The interviews are qualitative sources and do not constitute a statistically representative sample. Personal accounts of pressure are presented as interviewee testimony where no decision by a competent authority is publicly available. The report uses political expressions such as “construction mafia” and “forestry mafia” as public descriptions used by officials and the media for potentially organised networks of interests, rather than as established criminal-law classifications.

2. A Crisis in Natural Resource Governance

Environmental security problems in Montenegro are not a collection of unrelated incidents. They point to broader systemic failures in the governance of natural resources and land. The short-term economic benefits of certain investments and resource extraction accrue to a limited number of actors, while citizens, local communities and public budgets bear the costs of pollution, loss of land, harm to health and remediation.

This pattern is visible in unplanned coastal urbanisation, illegal gravel extraction and logging, uncontrolled quarrying, the energy system's dependence on coal, infrastructure development in environmentally sensitive areas and waste management that still relies heavily on illegal dumping or even burning, with only two legal sanitary landfills.

The problem is therefore the way decisions about land and natural resource use are made and implemented, rather than development itself. Environmental impact assessments are often reduced to procedural formalities; the public is involved only after key decisions have been made; institutional responsibilities overlap; and inspections and sanctions frequently fail to deter violations. Within such a system, continuing harmful or illegal practices can be more profitable than complying with the rules.

Environmental activists are consequently often the first to uncover and document problems, inform the public, submit complaints and connect citizens with the responsible institutions. Although their work provides essential oversight and helps correct failures, activists cannot and should not replace institutions responsible for environmental protection and law enforcement.

The central argument of this research is that Montenegro's greatest environmental security challenge lies not simply in the number of individual cases, but in a governance system in which private benefits from natural resource use often remain concentrated, while the environmental, health and financial consequences are transferred to society as a whole.

The footprint of extraction



An illustrative collage of pressures on rivers and natural resources.

3. Domestic and International Context

3.1. The Ecological State: From Constitutional Commitment to Enforcement

Montenegro's Constitution defines the country as an ecological state and guarantees the right to a healthy environment. This legal identity creates strong expectations, but cannot replace inspection services, municipal infrastructure, data or judicial protection. In its 2025 assessment of Chapter 27, the European Commission reported some progress, particularly on waste legislation and participation in the LIFE programme, while calling for urgent strengthening of administrative capacity, inspections and investment coordination. Of the 281 activities in the action plan, 109, or 38%, had been implemented by June 2025. [1][2]

The planned 2026 budget amounted to EUR 3.79 billion, with a capital budget of EUR 305 million, including environmental projects. However, environmentally relevant expenditure is spread across several ministries, capital projects, local governments, the Eco Fund and public enterprises. An aggregate figure therefore does not show how much funding supports inspections, prevention, monitoring and enforcement. Programme budgeting should be linked to outcomes: the number of risks eliminated, air and water quality, recycling rates and cases prosecuted. [39]

3.2. The Industrial and Transitional Legacy and Changes Since 2020

Some current risks stem from the Yugoslav industrial and energy legacy: centralised production, coal, large industrial facilities and infrastructure built before modern standards for assessing cumulative environmental impacts. This was followed by a long period of rule by a dominant party descended from the communist establishment, marked by an inequitable transition and extensive privatisation of companies and, ultimately, public assets such as natural resources. During this period, Montenegro also became a consumer society based on imports, foreign investment and services, predominantly tourism.

According to several interviewees, the change of government in 2020 made institutions more open and reduced some of the fear among citizens, but did not automatically eliminate clientelism, corruption, weak systemic oversight or short-term, unsustainable resource management.

The campaign against small hydropower plants presents a more complex picture. Duško Marković's government began reviewing the policy in 2019 following strong local protests. After the change of government, the 42nd Government terminated seven contracts and effectively halted new approvals. This was a political and administrative moratorium, rather than a general statutory ban, and its scope depends on subsequent decisions. [11][12]

Under the 43rd Government, led by Dritan Abazović, environmental crime became more explicitly framed as a security issue. In early 2023, illegal structures along the Morača were demolished and several operators were stopped. The National Council for the Fight against High-Level Corruption discussed construction and forestry crime, involving police services, inspection authorities, the armed forces and the National Security Agency. The terms "construction mafia" and "forestry mafia" were political descriptions; investigations, confiscation of proceeds and the durability of the measures provide the real test. Following the replacement of the 43rd Government, led by a "green party", there was a lengthy wait for renewed attention to environmental challenges and environmental security. Civil society largely carried the burden of keeping these issues in focus, continuing to expose failures and plans that threatened natural resources. At one point, almost the entire civil society sector united to challenge the agreement between Montenegro and the United Arab Emirates and Eagle Hills' controversial investments. Subsequently, by launching the "Čuvaj da te čuva" campaign, the EU Delegation in Montenegro re-established cooperation between environmental civil society and the current Government, led by Milojko Spajić, with the aim of accelerating EU accession and highlighting the importance of government–civil society cooperation in that process. [16][17]

3.3. The EU, Geopolitics and Emerging Pressures

EU integration both strengthens protection and accelerates investment. Natura 2000, water and air quality standards, climate law and the Environmental Crime Directive provide tools for accountability. However, European demand for critical raw materials, energy and infrastructure may create new pressures if the transition merely replaces one extractive project with another. Brskovo, Kruševo, Brajići, Sinjajevina and Komarnica are therefore more than local disputes: they test whether the state bases its decisions on cumulative harm, alternatives and community rights, or on other influences.

International investors and lenders must be subject to the same rules regardless of their country of origin. Chinese financing of major infrastructure, European funds, Gulf investors and regional companies alter a small state's negotiating position. Protecting the public interest requires publication of contracts, assessment of fiscal and environmental risks, and public consultation before political commitments are made to a project.

Sinjajevina illustrates the overlap between security and environmental policy. The disputed site concerns a military training ground, not a "NATO base". The European Commission continues to call for an appropriate solution. Local livestock farmers and the Save Sinjajevina initiative have shown that national security cannot be defined without considering the security of water, pastures, food and local livelihoods. [2][40]

4. The Environment and Human Security

4.1. Air Quality, Energy and a Just Transition for Pljevlja

Air pollution is the most immediate public health risk. In 2024, the EPA recorded exceedances of the daily PM10 limit on 95 days in Pljevlja and 103 days in Bijelo Polje, against the permitted 35. Pljevlja's annual average PM2.5 concentration was 32.76 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$. The thermal power plant is only one source: domestic heating, traffic, temperature inversions and other sources contribute to cumulative exposure. [3]

A 2016 World Bank assessment linked air pollution in Podgorica, Nikšić and Pljevlja to more than 250 premature deaths and around 140 hospital admissions annually. This is an older modelled estimate, rather than a current annual count, and illustrates the scale of the health burden. The WHO and EEA confirm that fine particulate matter increases the risk of cardiovascular and respiratory disease, stroke and cancer. [5][6][7]

The Pljevlja thermal power plant exhausted its 20,000 permitted operating hours under the opt-out regime in 2020 but continued operating, prompting proceedings by the Energy Community. Its environmental retrofit may reduce certain emissions, but does not resolve the town's dependence on coal or ensure long-term alignment with climate objectives. The European Commission calls for a permanent closure plan and a strategic approach to a just transition. [2][8]

Eko-tim has translated abstract decarbonisation goals into social policy. Its research among women employed at the coal mine and thermal power plant found widespread fear of adverse consequences. The organisation proposed a dedicated Eco Fund programme for economic diversification, retraining, small businesses and remediation. This approach is valuable because it demands that revenue from emission credits and environmental charges visibly benefit the community bearing the greatest burden of transition. [9][28]

4.2. Waste: Rising Volumes and the Predominance of Disposal

In 2024, Montenegro generated 375,459.7 tonnes of municipal waste, 4.3% more than the previous year, equivalent to 602.2 kg per person. Waste collection services covered 88.4% of the population. Of all municipal waste treated, 343,742.5 tonnes, or 91.6%, was disposed of. Material recycling accounted for 1,016.7 tonnes, approximately 0.27% of the treated total, as calculated from MONSTAT's table. [4]

This is more than a technical problem of waste containers. Its causes include inadequate prevention, poor separation at source, fragmented municipal utilities, insufficient regional infrastructure, uneven service provision in the north and weak sanctions. One-off clean-ups have educational and mobilisation value, but dumps recur without monitoring, cameras, identification of offenders and accessible legal waste services.

Waste intensifies other risks: burning tyres and plastics pollutes the air; dumping in riverbeds and flood channels increases flood risk; marine litter and plastics harm fisheries and tourism; and unmanaged sites disproportionately affect poorer neighbourhoods. The first tyre-shredding facility, commissioned in 2025 with a technical capacity of around five tonnes per hour, represents important progress, but its performance must be measured by the actual annual volume of tyres collected and processed. [19]

4.3. Water: Quality, Gravel Extraction, Wastewater and Hydropower

Of the 30 river sites assessed in 2024, only seven, or 23.3%, met the required overall status. This finding shows that abundant water does not automatically ensure water security. Pressures include municipal and industrial wastewater, gravel extraction, construction in riverbeds, small and large hydropower projects, waste and weak oversight. [3]

Only six towns have wastewater treatment plants, while Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Plav, Andrijevica and Danilovgrad discharge their wastewater directly into rivers. Podgorica has also begun constructing a new wastewater treatment plant, as the existing facility, dating from the communist period, serves a population equivalent of approximately 80,000.

The campaign against small hydropower plants was one of the most important formative experiences for local activism. Bukovica, Bare Kraljske, Lještanica and other rivers mobilised residents across political divides because water is essential to household survival, livestock farming and local tourism. In 2019, Green Home and its partners submitted more than 6,300 signatures calling for a permanent halt to small hydropower development. The termination of seven contracts after 2020 was a political outcome of this pressure, although RERI's legal analysis cautions that a moratorium is not equivalent to a general statutory ban. [11][12][26]

4.4. Forests, Wildfires and Climate Resilience

Forests provide more than timber: they regulate water, stabilise soils, cool the local climate, sustain biodiversity and reduce landslide and flood risks. Global Forest Watch estimates that Montenegro lost approximately 22,000 hectares of tree cover between 2001 and 2025, including around 4,700 hectares associated with fire. Tree-cover loss is not automatically evidence of illegal deforestation, but is an indicator of pressure requiring field investigation and administrative analysis. [10]

Prosecution data for 2025 record newly filed complaints concerning 57 individuals for forest theft and 10 for forest devastation. Including the backlog, complaints concerning 68 individuals were handled for forest theft; those concerning 29 were dismissed, while indictment proposals were filed against 30 individuals. Case numbers do not reveal the full extent of damage, as they depend on detection, recording and legal classification. [14]

Wildfires create a cycle of risk: vegetation loss increases heat and erosion, while drought and heatwaves raise the likelihood of further fires. A programme to restore burned areas in Piperi and Kuči, launched in 2026 under the “Čuvaj da te čuva” campaign, envisages an initial restoration area of more than one million square metres. Its success should be measured by seedling survival, habitat recovery and reduced erosion, rather than the number of trees planted on the day of an event. [21]

4.5. Land Use, Mining, Quarries and Tourism

Illegal and unplanned construction permanently transforms land. In 2025, criminal complaints were filed against 190 individuals for construction without notification and documentation. Including earlier cases, complaints concerning 329 individuals were handled, and those concerning 163 remained unresolved. On the coast, where land, the shoreline and infrastructure face the greatest pressure, the damage affects sewerage, water supply, traffic, landscapes and the UNESCO-recognised values of the Bay of Kotor. [14]

Miloš Gezović describes the Bay of Kotor as an area under cumulative pressure: proposed quarries, construction, vessels, mass tourism, marine litter and threats to Solila and Vrmac cannot be assessed project by project. The bay's carrying capacity and the combined impacts on water, air, biodiversity and quality of life must be assessed.

Brskovo demonstrates how a local initiative can change a state decision. The Healthy Mojkovac citizens' initiative, experts, Green Home and other actors challenged the project over concerns about health, waste, forests, water and proximity to the Tara catchment. On 30 May 2024, the Government terminated the concession agreement after the deadline for remedying deficiencies expired. This outcome was a victory for public mobilisation, but also a reminder that opaque and legally weak contracts can expose the state to arbitration. [34][35]

Komarnica is a current test. The Montenegrin Ecologists Society (CDE), Green Home, CZIP, local nature enthusiasts and others involved in the Save Komarnica campaign highlight endemic species, the landscape and links to the Durmitor UNESCO site. In 2025, the power utility EPCG temporarily withdrew the environmental impact assessment report for revision, while strategic documents continued to

consider the project. Withdrawing the report does not secure lasting protection: the canyon's protection regime and energy alternatives must be determined first. [36][45]

Tyres, smoke and fire



A symbolic illustration of tyre burning and forest fires.

5. Environmental Crime and the Institutional Response

Offences against the environment and spatial planning were far from a marginal issue in the 2025 prosecution statistics. Complaints were filed against 348 individuals, bringing the total to 527 when 179 carried over from the previous period are included. Complaints against 122 individuals were dismissed, indictment proposals were filed against 155, and complaints against 225 remained pending. The caseload consisted mainly of illegal construction, forest theft, illegal fishing and hunting, forest devastation, environmental damage and unauthorised extraction of river sediment. [14]

In September 2025, the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office established a multidisciplinary Operational Team for Combating Environmental Crime. The team mapped a regional pattern: forest theft and illegal construction in the north, gravel extraction in the central region and illegal construction on the coast. Its tasks include coordination, financial investigations, international cooperation and addressing machinery confiscation. [14][15]

In February 2026, responding to a freedom of information request, the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that a Group for Combating Environmental Crime had been formally established within the Crime Fighting Sector, in the organisational unit responsible for corruption, economic crime and financial investigations. This distinction matters: the police group and the prosecutorial operational team have different roles and do not constitute a single "special unit". [13]

Oversight in the field



An illustration of site monitoring using a drone and a video surveillance camera.

6. The Environmental Movement: Organisations, Initiatives and Activists

6.1. The Emergence and Development of Montenegro's Environmental Movement

Montenegro's environmental movement did not emerge at a single moment or through the creation of one organisation. It developed gradually: from the idea of an ecological state and the first local associations, through the professionalisation of NGOs and major national campaigns, to today's extensive network of local initiatives, specialist organisations, informal groups, journalists and individual activists. It is therefore more accurate to speak of the movement's evolution than of a single founding date.

The symbolic starting point was the adoption of the Declaration on the Ecological State of Montenegro in Žabljak on 20 September 1991. The Declaration established nature protection and sustainable development as strategic national commitments and was presented the following year at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Its adoption cannot, however, be equated with the emergence of an organised civic movement. It primarily provided a political and constitutional framework, giving environmental initiatives a powerful symbol and a benchmark against which state policy could subsequently be assessed. The gap between that declared commitment and conditions on the ground became an enduring driver of environmental activism. Government of Montenegro

More clearly organised civic action emerged during the 1990s. The Society of Young Ecologists Nikšić was established on 18 January 1993 at the initiative of local secondary-school and university students, showing that young people united around local problems and practical environmental protection were among the first drivers of environmental organising. EXPEDITIO was founded in Kotor in 1997, extending environmental action to sustainable spatial development, architecture, cultural heritage and public participation in planning. These organisations provided the movement's early infrastructure: locally rooted, they gradually connected their work to broader questions of national development. Society of Young Ecologists Nikšić; EXPEDITIO

The early 2000s marked a turning point in the development of a more stable environmental NGO sector. Biology students founded Green Home in 2000, while ornithologists, conservation specialists and students established the Centre for Protection and Research of Birds (CZIP) that same year. The Breznica Environmental Society also emerged in Pljevlja during this period, focusing on industrial pollution and the protection of watercourses and forests. These organisations introduced research, biodiversity monitoring, expert analysis, public education, participation in public hearings and cooperation with international organisations. Environmental activism began to evolve from occasional actions into continuous, more professionally organised work. Green Home; CZIP; Breznica Environmental Society

The 2004 "Neću baru, hoću Taru" ("I Want the Tara, Not a Reservoir") campaign was the first major demonstration that an environmental issue could mobilise the public nationally. Opposition to the Buk Bijela hydropower project brought together residents, rafting operators, environmental organisations, experts, the media and international institutions. Activists combined protests, a petition, expert arguments, appeals to UNESCO and public pressure. The campaign grew beyond individual organisations into a broad coalition defending a natural asset. On 14 December 2004, Montenegro's Parliament adopted the Declaration on the Protection of the Tara River, rejecting interventions that would threaten the canyon. This case established a pattern repeated in later campaigns: local legitimacy, expert evidence, public mobilisation and international or legal and institutional follow-up, alongside engagement with decision-makers. UNESCO report on Durmitor and the Tara; campaign chronology

Alongside major national campaigns, a longer-term model of expert advocacy developed. The struggle for the Ulcinj Salina showed that environmental activism can rest on years of monitoring, scientific evidence, legal action and international pressure, rather than always taking the form of mass protest. Following the Salina's privatisation and the cessation of salt production, CZIP, local activists and international partners worked for years to establish its importance and prevent land-use conversion. On 24 June 2019, the

Salina was designated a nature park, and it was added to the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance that same year. This outcome resulted from sustained cooperation between local and specialist organisations, European institutions and international conservation networks. EuroNatur

Montenegro's accession to the Aarhus Convention in 2009 created further opportunities for environmental activism. Access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice became important tools for organisations and citizens. The establishment of the Nikšić Aarhus Centre within the Ozon Environmental Movement in 2011 symbolised a shift from environmental education and public campaigns towards more systematic use of legal and institutional mechanisms. Activists increasingly submitted information requests and complaints, participated in public hearings and scrutinised institutions, alongside organising activities and protests. OSCE – The Aarhus Convention in South-Eastern Europe; Ozon Environmental Movement

The Beranselo case in the early 2010s marked the strengthening of local civic resistance. Residents blocked access to the Vasove Vode landfill for years, arguing that it threatened their health, land and the Lim River. They faced police interventions, detention and misdemeanour fines, while environmental and human rights organisations provided expert, legal and public support. In 2014, the Government abandoned further waste disposal at the site, and remediation subsequently began. Beranselo showed that a local community could lead a campaign while established NGOs supplied expertise, media contacts and access to state institutions. Al Jazeera Balkans; Vijesti

From the mid-2010s, European integration became another important framework for action. In April 2016, fifteen organisations established Coalition 27 to jointly monitor legislative alignment and implementation of obligations relating to the environment and climate change. This strengthened the movement's specialist and advocacy work on EU negotiations, shadow reports and public policy proposals. The opening of negotiations on Chapter 27 in December 2018 gave environmental organisations further opportunities to connect domestic problems with European standards and state commitments. National Strategy for Chapter 27; Government of Montenegro – Chapter 27

A new wave of environmental activism became particularly visible between 2018 and 2020. Whereas established NGOs had previously initiated most campaigns, residents defending rivers, forests, pastures and springs from specific projects increasingly took centre stage. Protests against small hydropower plants on the Bukovica, at Bare Kraljske, on the Lještanica and on other watercourses connected local communities with environmental organisations, lawyers and experts. Public pressure contributed to a review of incentives and concessions, and the Government terminated seven concession agreements in late 2020. These campaigns showed that environmental mobilisation becomes stronger when citizens view an issue as a matter of household survival, farming, livestock and the local economy, as well as nature protection. Balkan Green Energy News

The Save Sinjajevina movement emerged during the same period. Local communities first learned of plans for a military training ground in 2018, followed by protests on Sinjajevina and in Podgorica in 2019. The campaign linked livestock farmers, local families, activists, scientists and international organisations. The Coalition for Sustainable Development (KOR) also emerged from this wave of cooperation in 2019, seeking to connect different local struggles within a wider environmental network. Residents' weeks-long vigil and physical presence on Sinjajevina in 2020 prevented a planned military exercise, while the Government formally abandoned the establishment of the training ground in July 2025. Sinjajevina demonstrated that a movement could be locally rooted, nationally visible and internationally connected at the same time. Save Sinjajevina; 2025 decision

During the 2020s, the movement expanded further and developed more specialised areas of work. Campaigns for Komarnica, against reopening the Brskovo mine, against illegal gravel extraction on the Morača and Cijevna, and against forest destruction, illegal dumps and construction in protected areas linked conventional environmental activism with corruption, public resource governance and institutional accountability. The Komarnica campaign relied on field research, scientists, international support and protest and educational camps. In Brskovo, local opposition combined expert analysis and public pressure before the Government terminated the concession agreement in May 2024.

At the same time, new actors emerged outside the traditional professional NGO model. Ecopatriotizam began in 2021 as an informal women's group brought together through clean-ups and local community work. Initiatives such as Ozelenimo Crnu Goru (Let's Green Montenegro) linked volunteering, reforestation and the restoration of degraded areas with public campaigns and institutional cooperation. KOD, the Montenegrin Ecologists Society, Eko-tim, Zero Waste Montenegro, Heal Boka Bay and others brought different specialisms, from policy analysis and biodiversity research to waste management, marine protection and practical field activities. The movement became broader without becoming centralised. Ecopatriotizam; Ozelenimo Crnu Goru

The latest phase is characterised by digital tools, field recording, social media, drones and interactive maps. Reporting platforms allow citizens to send organisations and institutions photographs and locations of potential environmental offences. A map of environmental hotspots brings together data on dumps, wastewater, quarries, small hydropower plants, gravel extraction, logging and air pollution.

Activism is thus moving from isolated reactions towards systematic documentation and monitoring of official responses. The "Čuvaj da te čuva" campaign has further connected citizens, environmental organisations, the EU Delegation, and national and local institutions in reporting, remediation and prevention. Crne Tačke; EU Delegation in Montenegro

The movement's development has also influenced how institutions view environmental problems. Sustained documentation of illegal gravel extraction, forest theft, unauthorised construction and other forms of destruction has helped establish environmental protection as an issue of organised and economic crime. In 2025, guidance was issued on establishing a specialised police unit or team to combat environmental crime. This represents a significant shift from the earlier tendency to treat environmental problems as isolated minor offences or municipal service issues. Government of Montenegro

Taken as a whole, Montenegro's environmental movement developed through several parallel strands: specialist nature conservation, local resistance by affected communities, civic scrutiny of institutions, legal advocacy, practical fieldwork and investigative documentation of environmental crime. It has no single leadership, membership or political programme. It is best described as a decentralised, pluralistic network of actors organised around campaigns, with cooperation usually emerging in response to a specific threat or place.

This structure is both a strength and a weakness. Decentralisation allows local initiatives to emerge quickly and makes political control of the movement more difficult, but cooperation often depends on personal relationships, short-term projects and exhausting individual commitment. Nevertheless, the development from early youth associations to contemporary campaigns shows that environmental activism is no longer a marginal form of civic engagement. It has become a sphere in which nature protection, public health, local livelihoods, resource governance and the rule of law are directly connected.

6.2. CZIP

The Centre for Protection and Research of Birds was founded in December 2000 and is a member of BirdLife International and IUCN. Its distinctive approach combines field monitoring, science, education and public advocacy. Its long-standing work on the Ulcinj Salina helped keep the area on the agenda of the EU, the Bern Convention and the Montenegrin public. Alongside bird monitoring, CZIP has supported habitat restoration, organised international conferences and pursued legal initiatives. [22][23]

CZIP's contribution extends beyond birds. Its 2023 review of Important Bird Areas identified 33 sites, providing an expert basis for the future Natura 2000 network. The organisation also works on large carnivores, old-growth forests, poaching, Velika Plaža and Komarnica. This model shows why activism needs multi-year data: political decisions may change, but monitoring preserves evidence of trends. CZIP has also worked for years to prevent poaching and has developed the capacity to assist state authorities in combating poaching and environmental destruction, including by donating essential equipment to services such as the ranger service of Montenegro's national parks.

6.3. Green Home

Green Home was founded by biology students on 14 February 2000. Its programmes cover nature conservation, energy and climate, alongside work on waste, resources and European integration. Its strength lies in linking technical analysis with public advocacy: opposing hydropower plants on the Morača and small hydropower development, supporting the Komarnica and Brskovo campaigns, and monitoring Chapter 27. [24]

In the campaign against small hydropower plants, Green Home connected local communities with a national petition and legal proceedings. More than 6,300 signatures were submitted to Parliament in 2019. That number did not stop the projects on its own, but demonstrated that the issue extended beyond an isolated local dispute and raised the political cost of continuing incentives for projects with limited energy benefits and substantial local impacts. [26]

6.4. Montenegrin Ecologists Society

The Montenegrin Ecologists Society (CDE) was founded on 10 August 2012 as an independent non-profit organisation using an interdisciplinary approach and applied ecology. Its work covers Natura 2000 habitat mapping, freshwater and marine ecosystems, caves, forests and high mountain pastures. [25]

Andrijana Mićanović emphasises that EU mechanisms give civil society more scope to act, but that energy, mining and infrastructure departments often carry greater political weight than nature conservation. CDE's work on the Zeta, Morača and Komarnica illustrates the role of a specialist NGO: establishing which species, habitats and cumulative risks are present before a political dispute develops.

6.5. Eko-tim

Eko-tim specialises in energy, climate, the Green Agenda and just transition. It publishes analyses of Green Agenda implementation, monitors energy policy and works with the Pljevlja community. Its proposal for a dedicated just transition programme would channel revenue from emission credits and environmental charges into new jobs, retraining, local infrastructure and remediation. [28][44]

This contribution matters because it challenges the apparent choice between employment and health. A just transition is more than a closure date for the thermal power plant: it is an agreement with the community about who decides, who pays, who receives new opportunities and how reduced exposure to pollution is measured.

6.6. KOD

KOD connects environmental protection with the rule of law and corruption. Miodrag Vujović describes a method that begins with a citizen's report and continues through information requests, requests for inspections, formal complaints, media pressure and long-term follow-up. Its focus includes illegal extraction of stone and gravel, illegal logging, wastewater, dumps and the restoration of burned areas.

His central observation is that a public hearing or working group does not amount to cooperation unless the institution explains why comments were rejected and publishes deadlines. KOD also warns about project-based funding: a case lasting several years can easily lose the person following it once a grant ends.

6.7. Ozelenimo Crnu Goru

Ozelenimo Crnu Goru operates as an initiative that builds coalitions among citizens, municipalities, state authorities, companies and international partners. Within this model, Vuk Vujisić combines his earlier investigative journalism experience, including years of work on illegal gravel extraction along the Morača and Cijevna, with field activities, digital tools and advocacy for a specialised response to environmental crime. The Čuvaj.me and CrneTačke.com platforms are intended to turn scattered reports into cases with publicly visible status information. [72][73]

The model's greatest contribution is feedback: citizens should be able to see who is taking action and how a case was resolved, rather than merely submit a photograph. Its greatest risk is that the platform becomes a parallel system without binding deadlines. Monthly data on reports, responses, sanctions and recurring problems must therefore be public and machine-readable.

6.8. Ecopatriotizam

Ecopatriotizam describes itself as Montenegro's first women's environmental movement. Ivana Čogurić Rašović reports almost six years of activism and more than 250 clean-ups, with a more recent focus on ecofeminism. Her perspective reveals the unequal distribution of environmental harm and unpaid work: women residents and activists often address the consequences of systemic failures while their causes remain unresolved.

The interview documents administrative and psychological pressure. The interviewee describes proceedings following a protest performance as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), which she says was dismissed after a public response. She also describes an instance in which her personal data were disclosed to a person she had reported for a waste-related offence. Even where proceedings result in no penalty, the time, fear and expense involved can deter an activist from making another report.

6.9. Ljute Kamilice and Heal Boka Bay

Miloš Gezović combines work with children and young people with protection of the Bay of Kotor. Ljute Kamilice uses workshops and practical activities to develop habits, while Heal Boka Bay works on the marine environment, biodiversity and sustainable bay management. Current priorities include quarries, dumps, recycling, underwater clean-ups, Solila and Vrmac.

Gezović notes that projects affecting the bay's environment are often considered individually, although their combined impacts may exceed its carrying capacity. In his interview, he reports serious threats linked to his public engagement and threats of legal proceedings. This example shows why activist protection must include risk assessment, urgent legal assistance, digital security and a clearly designated police contact.

6.10. Optimisti

Optimisti is a youth association based in Nikšić, primarily concerned with improving conditions for young people and developing a youth centre and local network. Its relevance lies precisely in its position outside the specialist environmental NGO sector: environmental policy reaches beyond a narrow circle of expert organisations when youth, cultural and local actors engage with it. [27]

Optimisti has participated in clean-up networks and campaigns against plastic bags, including the "Do You Need a Bag for That?" project. Its role centres on mobilisation and communication, connecting responsibility for waste and public space with young people's everyday lives.

6.11. Coalition for Sustainable Development (KOR)

The Coalition for Sustainable Development (KOR) developed as an open civic platform and network of environmental and civic activists and initiatives protecting natural resources from destruction and mismanagement. Its value lies in connecting local struggles that would otherwise remain isolated, from rivers and hydropower to mining, the Tara, Durmitor and spatial governance, and in providing public solidarity to people confronting much stronger political or economic interests. [58][71]

Aleksandar Dragičević is a member and one of KOR's most publicly recognisable figures. This report therefore considers his work within the coalition's wider activities rather than as a separate movement. A long-standing civic and environmental activist, he documents problems in the field, uses social and traditional media, supports local initiatives and connects environmental issues with spatial planning, corruption and the public interest. He has received an award for his contribution to fighting corruption

in environmental protection and has been publicly presented as Montenegro's first eco-ambassador. [29][31][71]

In Brskovo, he publicly followed the interdepartmental commission's work and demanded termination of the concession; at Velika Plaža, he criticised opaque investment agreements. According to his public statements, he spent around 80 days in the field in Zeta over two and a half years, addressing gravel extraction, waste burning and dumping, and poaching. His engagement shows the value of an individual activist who quickly connects cases, but also the vulnerability of work dependent on personal exposure. [32][33]

In September 2025, he reported politicians' statements to the police, regarding them as threats and an invitation for people to come to his home. Institutions responded, and civil society organisations condemned the targeting. The case matters regardless of its eventual legal classification: political messages directed at a recognisable activist can mobilise a wider audience and create a real security risk. [30]

6.12. How Roles Complement One Another and Where the System Remains Weak

The movement is not a network of identical organisations. CZIP, Green Home, CDE, Eko-tim and EnvPro produce expert findings, legal and policy analyses, and long-term monitoring. KOD, Ozelenimo Crnu Goru, KOR and other activist actors turn citizens' reports into public and institutional cases. Ecopatriotizam, Optimisti and Ljute Kamilice bring environmental issues to women, young people and communities that may not identify with specialist language. Heal Boka Bay and local initiatives provide detailed local knowledge: where pressure emerges, who is affected and whether a problem has returned after an intervention.

The most successful campaigns combine at least four functions: evidence, local legitimacy, public mobilisation and legal and institutional follow-up. Weaknesses arise when one person attempts to perform all four. A specialist organisation then spends its time on crisis communication; a local group without legal support enters proceedings at a disadvantage; a platform collects reports without the capacity to follow their outcomes; and one activist becomes the campaign's sole publicly exposed representative.

Function	Actors Usually Performing It	Gap to Address
Field and scientific evidence	CZIP, CDE, Green Home, Eko-tim, EnvPro, Heal Boka Bay	Multi-year monitoring and open datasets
Local mobilisation	Local initiatives, Ecopatriotizam, Optimisti, Ljute Kamilice	Small grants available quickly and without burdensome administration
Public exposure and reporting	KOD, Ozelenimo Crnu Goru, KOR, journalists and other activists	A secure channel, feedback and personal data protection
Legal and policy change	NGO coalitions, local communities, lawyers and international partners	Continuity after campaigns end and monitoring of implementation
Protection of people	Currently fragmented and largely ad hoc	An emergency fund, legal team, police contact point and psychological support

The interviews also reveal a generational challenge. The visibility of a few individuals facilitates mobilisation but creates dependence on their time and personal safety. Sustainable support for the movement must therefore develop a wider pool of experts, local coordinators, communications professionals and lawyers, alongside shared case monitoring. Results must not be lost when a project ends, a government changes or the person handling a case moves on.

6.13. The Wider Network of Organisations and Local Initiatives

A focus on the ten or so most visible actors must not obscure the wider network. Some organisations have permanent specialist teams, some rely on volunteers, and others become active when a particular

place is threatened. Their scale differs, but their contributions are complementary: some produce data, some preserve institutional memory, some mobilise local communities, and others connect environmental issues with youth engagement, urban planning and culture.

Expeditio

Based in Kotor, Exeditio has worked on sustainable spatial development, architecture, cultural heritage and public space since 1997. Its relevance to environmental security lies in showing that environmental destruction extends beyond pollution: unplanned construction changes landscapes, strains water supply and sewerage, reduces public space and threatens the bay's cultural and natural values. Its contribution is an expert link between spatial planning, citizen participation and heritage protection. [47]

Zero Waste Montenegro and Cleanup Montenegro

Founded in 2016, Zero Waste Montenegro works on waste prevention, reuse, separation and zero-waste models. The Cleanup Montenegro network connects dozens of local groups and volunteers, using clean-ups as an entry point for advocacy for systemic change. Its particular value lies in shifting attention from who will collect waste to why it is generated, where it ends up and who bears the cost. Limitations arise when municipal infrastructure and extended producer responsibility fail to keep pace with civic mobilisation, or municipal services cannot meet community needs. Led by Vanja Cicmil, Zero Waste Montenegro monitors the transition in waste management and highlights shortcomings and consequences if Montenegro chooses a system based on thermal treatment or incineration. [48][49]

Society of Young Ecologists Nikšić and the Ozon Environmental Movement

Established in 1993, the Society of Young Ecologists Nikšić preserves the local movement's organisational memory, connecting generations through work with young people, water, fires and nature. The Ozon Environmental Movement, founded in 2006, developed work on public participation, the Aarhus Convention, pollution reporting and river protection. Together, they show how Nikšić, with its industrial legacy and strong volunteering community, generates both expert and civic responses. Their challenge is shared by younger groups: long-running cases require a stable core team, legal support and public information on the outcomes of complaints. [50][51]

Naša Akcija and the Network for Youth Activism of Montenegro

Naša Akcija connects volunteering, community development and protection of local places, particularly in the Bay of Kotor and through work with young people. The Network for Youth Activism of Montenegro brings together young activists, volunteers and peer educators, integrating environmental issues into broader civic engagement. These organisations complement specialist biologists and lawyers by developing a new generation able to organise activities, communicate problems and participate in public procedures. [52][53]

MSJA and MogUL

The Dr Martin Schneider-Jacoby Association (MSJA) and Monitoring Group Ulcinj (MogUL) provide a strong local foundation for the defence of the Ulcinj Salina and the wider Ulcinj area. MSJA connects biodiversity, the local community and Schneider-Jacoby's legacy, while MogUL uses civic oversight, public advocacy and local anti-corruption work. Their contribution has political importance: the Salina's international status cannot replace sustained local pressure to implement decisions and ensure that Ulcinj's residents see the benefits of protection. [54][55]

Oči Podgorice

Oči Podgorice operates as a local information and civic platform, turning photographs, videos and reports into public issues concerning municipal services and public order, traffic, waste and urban space. Registered in 2021, the organisation's content has also become a television programme on the public

broadcaster. The model's strengths are speed and numerous local sources; its risks include uneven verification, dependence on platforms and the possibility that visibility at one location replaces systematic follow-up. Each viral case should therefore be linked to a case number, an institutional response and monitoring for recurrence. [56][57]

Coalition 27

Coalition 27 brings organisations together to monitor accession negotiations under Chapter 27, translating sectoral knowledge into joint reports and demands addressed to the state. Unlike campaign networks formed around an immediate threat to a place or resource, it focuses on structured scrutiny of European commitments. Its sustainability depends on continuity between annual reports, data sharing among members and public monitoring of institutional responses to each recommendation. [59]

Local Initiatives on the Front Line of Nature Protection

Save Sinjajevina, Save Komarnica, Healthy Mojkovac, KANA, Dalje nećeš moći and similar initiatives emerge when a threat has a name and a location. Their strengths are the legitimacy of people living with the consequences and their willingness to follow a case for years. Their weaknesses include limited funding and legal support, and the risk of disbanding after a single decision. The best model is for larger NGOs to provide expertise, legal protection, media access and an archive while preserving local ownership of the campaign.

6.14. Media: Public Scrutiny, Visibility and the Struggle to Frame the Story

An environmental case becomes politically significant only when it is visible, understandable and followed for long enough. RTCG established an environmental newsroom in 2019 and maintains a dedicated section. Vijesti and TV Vijesti provide national reach through daily reporting, Reflektor and Načisto. CIN-CG and Monitor connect environmental issues with corruption and institutional accountability, while RTV Nikšić and other local outlets document problems that rarely reach the national agenda. Activists' social media accelerate alerts, but newsrooms remain important for verification, the right of reply and follow-up. [60][61][68]

The most common weakness is episodic coverage rather than a complete absence of reporting. A clean-up or conflict makes the headlines, while less attention is paid to whether sanctions were imposed, damage repaired, plans changed or problems returned. Another weakness is personalisation: activists and politicians displace data, experts and affected communities. A third is the blending of environmental language with investment marketing, particularly when a company describes its own project as "green" or "sustainable" without an independent assessment of cumulative impacts.

Media outlets that regularly produce environmental content and cover environmental protection include RTCG (television, radio and website), Vijesti (television, website and newspaper), RTV Nikšić, PG TV, the weekly Monitor, RTV Budva, Pobjeda, Dan, Television Herceg Novi, Feral Bar, Portal Analitika, CdM, ETV and the MINA news agency. The Centre for Investigative Journalism also publishes its investigations through the Vijesti newspaper and website.

Eagle Hills: Labelled Promotion and Its Influence on the Public Agenda

A BIRN analysis republished on MANS's website documented how Eagle Hills Montenegro increased donations, sponsorships and promotional content across several media outlets alongside its investment plans and public disputes. It also recorded an organised visit by some journalists to company projects in the UAE and Egypt. Examples in Vijesti and on RTCG were labelled as promotional or sponsored content, an important distinction from undisclosed advertising. Nevertheless, labelling alone does not resolve the question of overall influence. Audiences should know who paid for the content and travel, while newsrooms should independently verify investors' environmental claims and give local communities and independent experts a voice. The mere existence of promotional content does not justify concluding that

editorial policy has been bought; it does justify demanding full transparency and safeguards for editorial independence. [62][63][64]

Botun: Legitimate Concerns, Infrastructure and Political Polarisation

The dispute over the wastewater treatment plant in Botun shows how an environmental issue can become a conflict over political identity. Residents have a legitimate right to seek information about health, technology, sludge, odours and the cumulative burden alongside the red-mud basins. At the same time, the WBIF project is justified in terms of protecting the Morača, Lake Skadar, public health and Podgorica's water supply. The media must consider both facts together: past injustice towards a community does not automatically make the plant harmful, while designation as a "project in the public interest" does not remove obligations of transparency and oversight. [65][66][67]

TV Adria gave considerable visibility to protests and opponents, but also published the mayor's and minister's arguments in favour of the project and information about contractual documentation. Without systematic analysis of a sample of coverage, it is not factually defensible to claim that the outlet opposed the plant for political reasons. A narrower assessment is supportable: confrontational headlines and the repetition of party messages may intensify polarisation unless accompanied by technical verification, explanations of risk and monitoring of agreed safeguards. [65][66]

7. Case Studies and Results

7.1. Small Hydropower Plants: From Local Resistance to National Policy Change

Conflicts over small hydropower plants are among the clearest examples of local environmental grievances becoming a national political issue. The concession model and incentive system enabled projects on small watercourses, while local communities experienced reduced flows, altered riverbeds, pressure on biodiversity and threats to water as a resource essential to daily life and the local economy.

Civic mobilisation did not originate in a single central organisation. It developed through multiple local disputes in which residents organised to protect rivers they used directly. Blockades, protests and petitions mobilised communities, while NGOs, lawyers and the media connected individual cases to the wider issues of concession policy and the public interest.

The combination of different roles was an important feature of the campaign. Local residents provided legitimacy and first-hand experience; specialist organisations supplied analysis and evidence; legal assistance enabled challenges to decisions and contracts; and sustained media coverage transformed a series of local conflicts into a political issue of national importance.

Policy towards small hydropower plants began changing in 2019. Following the change of government in 2020, seven contracts were terminated and new project approvals were effectively halted. Local campaigns thus achieved a result extending beyond individual rivers: they influenced how the state assesses the political and social acceptability of new projects.

This outcome should not, however, be presented as final and irreversible. No general statutory ban on all small hydropower plants was adopted, and some previously initiated projects and legal arrangements remain relevant. The campaign's long-term success therefore depends on policy continuity, the handling of existing projects and the system's ability to assess cumulative impacts on rivers and local communities before approving future energy developments.

The central lesson is that local mobilisation can change national policy when the experience of people directly affected by a project is combined with expert evidence, legal support and sustained public pressure.

Problem: the concession model and incentives enabled projects on small rivers with high local environmental costs. Method: blockades, petitions, legal assistance, media engagement and coalitions of local communities and NGOs. Result: policy began changing in 2019; after 2020, seven contracts were terminated and new approvals halted. Limitation: no general statutory ban was adopted, so the result depends on policy continuity and the handling of existing projects. [11][12]

7.2. Morača and Bolje Sestre: Strong Action, Incomplete Oversight

Problem: years of illegal river sediment extraction and the operation of aggregate processing facilities in the riverbed and sanitary protection zone threatened the Morača ecosystem and the Bolje Sestre spring, on which water supply to the Montenegrin coast depends. The case simultaneously concerns water protection, illicit profit, corruption, institutional accountability and the safety of those documenting the problem.

The civic response: during 2021, investigative journalist Vuk Vujisić published field findings on extraction along the Morača and Cijevna, submitted evidence to the authorities and maintained pressure for police, inspectors and prosecutors to become involved. Vijesti documented his months-long follow-up, the temporary interruption of some operations through inspections and arrests, and public accusations by people connected with the sites that he was responsible for triggering police action, alongside threats against him and other journalists. In 2022, Monitor recorded his account that his submission of evidence to a government team preceded a major police operation. [72][73]

Escalation of the institutional response: new footage published by Vujisić in January 2023 entered the national media and political debate. He and Aleksandar Dragičević were invited to a meeting of the National Council for the Fight against Corruption. Under the 43rd Government, interdepartmental inspections, demolition of illegal structures and intensified monitoring stopped several operators and removed part of the infrastructure. This sequence does not imply that one individual alone brought about a state decision, but confirms that investigative journalism, field evidence and sustained activist pressure were integral to the process that made the issue a national priority. [16][74]

An incomplete outcome: warnings in 2024, the seizure of a machine found operating again in early 2026, and CIN-CG's April 2026 finding that excavation continued at some locations show that the crackdown did not become a permanent system of oversight. Necessary measures include confiscating machinery and illicit proceeds, conducting financial investigations, holding officials accountable for enabling operations to resume, permanently removing facilities from the protection zone and adopting a measurable riverbed restoration plan. [17][75][76]

7.3. Brskovo: Local Communities, Expert Evidence and Scrutiny of Concession Policy

Plans to reopen the Brskovo mine near Mojkovac raised environmental, health, economic and institutional questions simultaneously. Supporters highlighted potential investment and jobs, while citizens and civil society organisations warned about mining waste, impacts on water, forests and soil, health risks and possible effects on the wider Tara catchment.

Brskovo was therefore more than a straightforward conflict between environmental protection and economic development. The central question was whether long-term environmental and health risks had been adequately assessed and whether the concession arrangement sufficiently protected the public interest.

The Healthy Mojkovac citizens' initiative gave local legitimacy to opposition to the project. The campaign involved protests, public advocacy and continuous monitoring of the procedure, while specialist organisations and civil society representatives analysed documentation and participated in the interdepartmental commission. The local conflict gradually became a question of concession policy quality and state responsibility when granting rights to exploit natural resources.

An important element of the campaign was its insistence that decisions account for potential costs to health, water, land, forests and Mojkovac's long-term development prospects, rather than relying solely on promised economic benefits.

On 30 May 2024, the Government of Montenegro terminated the concession agreement. This was a clear immediate result of civic and expert pressure, but also raised questions about state accountability for the way concession agreements are concluded. The contractual and arbitration exposure following termination shows that public-interest protection must be built into the process before a contract is signed, rather than only after conflict arises.

Brskovo therefore has significance beyond a single mining project. It shows that environmental security must be assessed during planning and concession allocation, through robust impact assessments, clear safeguards, transparent data and meaningful local participation. Otherwise, the state may be forced to choose between continuing an environmentally and socially contested project and accepting substantial legal and financial risks from terminating it later.

Problem: plans to reopen a polymetallic mine, raising concerns about waste, water, forests, health and the Tara. Method: local protests, expert analyses, NGO participation in the commission and sustained public scrutiny. Result: the Government terminated the agreement on 30 May 2024. Limitation: the state's contractual and arbitration exposure demonstrates the need to incorporate safeguards and risk assessment before granting a concession. [34][35]

7.4. “Čuvaj da te čuva”: From Campaign to a System of Accountability

The EU Delegation launched the campaign on 5 June 2025 with national and local institutions, the Eco Fund, civil society, businesses, schools and the media.

ČUVAJ.ME — Ozelenimo Crnu Goru developed the Čuvaj.me platform with the Ministry of Ecology and the EPA. The model combines reporting, field action, preventive infrastructure and institutional coordination. For the first time, citizens can anonymously report environmental offences and crimes and follow case outcomes and the actions of the responsible inspection authorities, including inspection documents, without needing to know which services or inspectorates have jurisdiction. Since 5 June 2025, 504 cases have been reported and 152 resolved. Illegal dumps and unlawful waste disposal account for the largest category, with 205 cases, alongside numerous reports of tyre burning, wastewater and illegal extraction of gravel and stone and illegal logging. [18]

Illegal dumps are being remediated as part of the campaign.

The campaign has achieved more than communication: it opened a reporting channel, helped establish specialised structures and linked clean-ups with monitoring. Nevertheless, reporting still focuses predominantly on activities. [19][20][21][41][42][43]

7.5. Ulcinj Salina: Long-Term Monitoring as a Source of Political Influence

The Salina demonstrates the value of persistence and international cooperation. The cessation of salt production and changes in ownership and governance threatened its water regime and a habitat of European importance. For years, CZIP combined bird counts, infrastructure restoration, public campaigns, legal initiatives and cooperation with the BirdLife network, the Bern Convention and European institutions. This made a local site a measure of the credibility of Montenegro’s nature conservation policy. [22][23]

Protected status and international attention are important achievements, but do not conclude the case. In 2025, the European Commission continued to call for sustainable management of the Salina. The key tests are a stable management body, funding, maintenance of pumps and embankments, expert monitoring and a model linking biodiversity with sustainable local development. The lesson is that a campaign can secure a decision yet still lose the habitat if daily management lacks funding and accountability. [2][23]

7.6. Komarnica: An Expert Coalition and the Limits of a Procedural Victory

The Komarnica campaign combined field research by CDE and its partners, support from Green Home and CZIP, local nature enthusiasts and the international expert community. In 2025, more than 200 scientists and experts and over 20 Montenegrin NGOs raised concerns about biodiversity, cumulative impacts and procedural weaknesses. EPCG subsequently withdrew the assessment report temporarily for revision. This was an important interruption to the project, but did not amount to a decision to protect the canyon. [36][45][46]

Komarnica exposes a frequent displacement of the central question: debate narrows to whether an assessment report has been adequately revised, instead of first establishing whether the loss of the canyon is acceptable, what energy alternatives exist and what the cumulative impact would be alongside existing developments. The campaign’s success should therefore be measured by the final decision on land use and energy, not merely by the return of a document for revision.

7.7. Sinjajevina: When Environmental and Security Policies Collide

The Sinjajevina dispute concerns a military training ground in an area used by local livestock farmers as common pasture and possessing significant natural and cultural value, rather than a “NATO base”. The Save Sinjajevina initiative linked traditional seasonal mountain settlements, food, water, biodiversity and

the community's right to participate in decisions about land on which it depends. Support from domestic NGOs and international networks brought the local conflict into European reporting. [2][40]

This case shows that environmental security cannot be subordinated to a narrow understanding of security. Any response must assess defence needs, ecosystem services, livestock farmers' livelihoods, alternative locations and decision-making procedures together. The temporary absence of exercises is not a lasting solution; the European Commission continues to expect an appropriate institutional outcome, and the protection process remains ongoing. [2]

7.8. What Campaigns Have Demonstrated and the Risks They Face

Case	Demonstrated Result	Remaining Systemic Risk
Small hydropower plants	Policy change, termination of seven contracts and a de facto halt to new approvals through a moratorium adopted by Montenegro's Parliament	Existing projects and possible future policy changes
Morača / gravel extraction	Demolition of structures, suspension of some extraction and installation of effective video surveillance	Resumption of extraction before elections to maintain social stability and inflows; fragmented oversight vulnerable to corruption
Brskovo	Termination of the concession agreement in 2024	Arbitration exposure and the risk of repeating inadequate contractual safeguards
Ulcinj Salina	Protection, international visibility and long-term data	Incomplete arrangements for sustainable management and funding of the established company
Komarnica	Temporary withdrawal of the assessment report and a broad expert coalition	The project has not been permanently halted and the canyon has not secured lasting protection; the Komarnica hydropower project remains in planning documents
Sinjajevina	Community mobilisation and European attention	No final resolution of the military training ground's status beyond government decisions that can be changed; Sinjajevina's protection process remains incomplete
Čuvaj da te čuva	A reporting platform, field activities and specialised institutional structures	The sustainability of activities depends on the system's willingness to work on cases continuously

7.9. What Determines the Success of an Environmental Campaign

Comparison of the cases analysed shows that successful environmental campaigns in Montenegro rarely depend on one actor or one method. The most significant results emerge when at least four elements are combined: local legitimacy, expert and field evidence, public mobilisation, and continuous legal and institutional follow-up.

Local communities give campaigns direct legitimacy and knowledge of the area. Specialist organisations translate local concerns into the language of biology, ecology, law, economics and public policy. The media and public campaigns increase the political cost of ignoring problems, while lawyers, civil society organisations and activists ensure that cases move beyond protests or headlines into administrative, inspection, prosecutorial or political processes.

Sinjajevina demonstrates the strength of connecting local communities, public mobilisation, scientific support and international visibility. Komarnica highlights the importance of expert research and a broad coalition. Brskovo shows how local opposition can be linked to expert analysis and scrutiny of concession arrangements. The campaign against small hydropower plants demonstrates the ability of

several local communities to turn individual conflicts into a national policy issue. The Morača case shows the importance of sustained field documentation and pressure on institutions when the problem involves organised exploitation of natural resources.

These cases also show that success should not be defined solely as the moment a project is halted. Environmental campaigns can achieve several types of results.

An immediate result occurs when a harmful activity is stopped, an assessment report withdrawn, a contract terminated or a specific intervention prevented. An institutional result occurs when a campaign leads to a new procedure, stronger oversight, a specialised body or changes in official practice. A political result occurs when a local problem changes broader public policy, as happened with small hydropower plants. A social result occurs when a campaign strengthens a local community, produces new data, connects organisations that had not previously cooperated or brings new citizens into the defence of the public interest.

A decision temporarily halting a project may therefore fall short of a final victory. Komarnica demonstrates the difference between a procedural delay and lasting protection. The Ulcinj Salina shows that formal protection has limited value without stable management and funding. The Morača shows that strong institutional action can deliver results, but problems may return without permanent oversight.

Campaigns' greatest weakness often emerges after the first success. Media attention declines, funding ends, institutional leadership changes and some activists move to other issues. Long-term monitoring of implementation is therefore just as important as the campaign that secured the decision.

The cases indicate that sustainable environmental activism does not involve civil society permanently replacing institutions. Its role is to uncover problems, provide public and expert scrutiny, represent affected communities and demand accountability. Lasting results exist only when institutions fulfil their statutory responsibilities and resolving problems no longer depends on activists' continuous personal exposure.

From clean-up to prevention

ČUVAJ DA TE ČUVA



Waste removal and site monitoring.



8. Pressures, Risks and Activists' Needs

Pressure extends beyond physical threats. Interviews and public cases reveal a broad range of forms: documents withheld or provided late; perfunctory public hearings without reasoned responses; political labelling; gender- and age-based dismissal; disclosure of personal data; threats of litigation; intimidation in the field; digital attacks; financial insecurity; and burnout.

Andrijana Mićanović describes ridicule and the undermining of younger women's professional authority. Ivana Čogurić Rašović discusses psychological recovery after proceedings and the breach of trust caused by disclosure of a complainant's identity to the person reported. Miloš Gezović reports serious threats and the need for institutional protection. Miodrag Vujović describes prolonged administrative exhaustion and a criminal complaint as a burden on his organisation. Vuk Vujisić stresses the security risks faced by people documenting environmental crime, including threats and actions that endanger activists' safety.

Protection against SLAPPs must include early assessment and prompt dismissal of abusive lawsuits, coverage of legal costs and support for defendants. EU Directive 2024/1069 covers cross-border civil cases, while Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2024)2 provides a broader framework. Montenegro needs a domestic mechanism protecting activists, journalists, scientists and local communities in purely domestic cases as well. [37][38]

Interviewees' experiences show that the risks facing Montenegro's environmental activists cannot be reduced to direct physical threats. Pressure arises at different stages: obtaining information, reporting irregularities, participating in public hearings, speaking to the media, engaging in court proceedings and monitoring institutional responses over time. Activist security should therefore be understood broadly as a combination of physical, legal, institutional, digital, financial and psychological security.

8.1. Administrative Exhaustion and Limited Access to Institutions

One of the most common forms of pressure is prolonged administrative exhaustion rather than an overt threat. Activists and organisations must submit information requests, reminders, complaints and repeated correspondence to obtain documentation or establish whether an institution has taken any action. This transfers part of the burden of oversight from institutions to citizens and civil society.

Miodrag Vujović of KOD highlights the difficulty of long-term case monitoring and the fact that the formal existence of a public hearing, working group or opportunity to submit comments does not necessarily ensure meaningful participation. If an institution does not explain why a comment was rejected, specify deadlines or allow implementation to be monitored, participation remains a formality.

These processes require time, people and legal support. For small organisations, every case lasting months or years permanently commits part of their limited capacity to the administrative follow-up of a single problem.

Andrijana Mićanović also emphasised this problem in relation to the Komarnica hydropower project. It took time to secure disclosure of information, yet the crucial questions remain unanswered: has the state genuinely abandoned the project, and what do citizens gain and give up under the current contracts?

8.2. Legal Procedures as Protection and a Potential Source of Pressure

The legal system is the main mechanism through which activists can seek to protect the public interest. At the same time, legal proceedings can become a source of pressure when used primarily to exhaust people or deter public engagement.

The experience of Ivana Čogurić Rašović, who faced legal action by local institutions over an act of activism, shows that even proceedings that ultimately produce no sanction can have serious consequences. Time spent in proceedings, the need for legal assistance, uncertainty and a sense of exposure may deter future reporting. Breaches of confidentiality are particularly serious when a complainant's identity or personal data become available to the person concerned by the complaint.

Protection against SLAPP proceedings should therefore extend beyond the final court outcome. It requires early assessment of whether proceedings constitute an abuse of rights, prompt legal assistance, the possibility of early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims and protection against disproportionate legal costs.

8.3. Threats and Security Risks in the Field

A particular level of risk arises when activists document activities capable of generating substantial illicit profits. Illegal natural resource extraction, unauthorised construction, illegal logging, waste dumping and other environmental crimes often require direct field presence, photography, filming and identification of responsible actors.

In his interview, Miloš Gezović discusses serious threats connected with his public engagement and the need for activist protection to extend beyond individuals' own risk judgements. Experiences of documenting gravel extraction on the Morača and Cijevna also show that a publicly recognisable person who consistently monitors environmental crime can become personally exposed to pressure and threats.

The problem is especially acute when one person collects evidence, communicates with citizens, contacts police and inspectors, speaks to the media and becomes the public face of a campaign. Threats to one activist can then jeopardise the continuity of the entire case.

A clear security protocol is therefore needed for activists working on high-risk cases: a police contact point, rapid risk assessment, secure evidence submission, recording of threats and clear feedback on action by the responsible authorities.

8.4. Political Labelling, Public Discrediting and Unequal Treatment

Pressure need not be legal or physical. Publicly labelling activists as opponents of development, political operatives or people supposedly acting against local interests can undermine the legitimacy of their work and increase personal exposure.

The interviews also reveal gender and generational dimensions. Andrijana Mićanović describes experiences in which younger women's professional authority is undermined or their contributions are treated less seriously. Such behaviour is difficult to capture through conventional security indicators, but affects the quality of public participation and individuals' willingness to remain active.

Institutional protection should therefore begin before an explicit threat arises. A culture is needed in which criticism, reporting irregularities and challenging development projects are recognised as legitimate forms of democratic participation, rather than evidence of hostility towards institutions or economic development.

8.5. Financial Insecurity and Dependence on Individuals

The funding model for environmental activism is a less visible but systemically important risk. Many cases last far longer than a project cycle. Court, administrative or inspection proceedings may take several years, while an organisation's project lasts six months or one year.

When funding ends, the environmental problem does not. Yet an organisation may lose the person following the case, access to legal assistance or resources for fieldwork. Institutional memory consequently remains attached to an individual rather than embedded in a system.

Informal local initiatives face a similar problem. They often have the strongest legitimacy because their members are directly affected by a project or environmental degradation, yet have the least financial, specialist and legal capacity. Supporting them should therefore mean providing expertise, legal assistance, small emergency grants and resources for long-term case monitoring, while preserving their independence from larger NGOs.

8.6. Psychological Strain and Burnout

Prolonged conflict with institutions, companies or local political and economic interests can create serious psychological strain. Activists work in small teams, often outside normal working hours, respond to citizens' reports and simultaneously try to fund their work.

Ivana Čogurić Rašović speaks of the need for psychological recovery after the proceedings she faced. Such experiences show that the consequences of activism extend beyond the immediate conflict. Fear, exhaustion and loss of trust in institutions can affect a person's willingness to report another problem or speak publicly over the long term.

Psychological support should therefore be treated as part of civil society's sustainability. Confidential counselling, opportunities to step back temporarily from intensive work and shared responsibilities within organisations can reduce campaigns' dependence on a few highly exposed individuals.

8.7. Making Activism Safer and More Sustainable

The interviews show that activists need more than statements of support. They need practical support arrangements that ensure people who expose a problem are not left alone when a case becomes contentious.

This requires accessible emergency legal assistance, an effective anti-SLAPP mechanism, a police contact point for high-risk cases, secure digital channels for evidence submission, protection of complainants' personal data, psychological support and multi-year core funding for organisations handling long-running cases.

Bringing in a new generation is equally important. The recognition enjoyed by a few activists may help mobilisation and media visibility, but a system dependent on a handful of people remains vulnerable. A sustainable environmental movement needs new experts, local coordinators, communications professionals, lawyers, researchers and young activists. It also needs shared databases so that case information does not disappear when the project, organisation or person responsible changes.

Long-term protection of environmental activists is therefore also a matter of society's ability to identify environmental risks promptly, document them and demand institutional accountability. When activists withdraw because of threats, financial exhaustion or prolonged proceedings, the state loses an important early-warning and public oversight mechanism.

Need	Why It Is Urgent	Proposed Mechanism
Emergency legal assistance	Deadlines begin immediately after a threat or lawsuit, requiring prompt action	A 24/7 contact, funding for a lawyer and early SLAPP assessment
Security protocol	Fieldwork exposes profitable illegal activities and often involves threats or even physical danger	A police contact point, risk assessment and secure preservation of evidence
Digital protection	Data loss and surveillance may expose sources; private information may be used for blackmail	Training, secure channels, devices and incident response
Psychological support	Chronic conflict and small teams lead to burnout	Confidential counselling, professional supervision and rest
Core funding through general support	Cases outlast project cycles	Multi-year institutional grants and an emergency fund
Developing a new generation	A few people carry most of the burden	Mentoring, training academies, scholarships and work with schools and young people
Coordination of resources and activities	Data and resources remain within closed circles	A shared case register, campaign calendar and division of roles

9. Recommendations

The findings show that improving environmental security depends primarily on consistent implementation of legislation, clear institutional accountability and the involvement of citizens and environmental organisations in decisions about natural resource governance.

9.1. Clearly Define Institutional Responsibilities

A binding response protocol is needed for environmental incidents and suspected environmental crime. It should identify the responsible institution, inspection deadlines and obligations for cooperation among police, prosecutors, inspection services and local governments. Complainants should be informed about inspections, findings and measures taken, as through the national Čuvaj.me platform. This must become binding on inspection authorities and officials, as required by law, rather than depend on an individual inspector's willingness to act.

9.2. Strengthen the Fight Against Environmental Crime

Specialised police and prosecution units need additional staff, equipment and professional training. Investigations should cover machinery owners, legal entities, money flows and potential official responsibility, as well as direct perpetrators. Repeated illegal extraction should trigger prompt seizure and confiscation of machinery and illicit proceeds, thereby deterring environmental offences and crimes.

9.3. Improve Inspection and Enforcement

Inspection services need sufficient staff, field vehicles, technical equipment and the ability to conduct unannounced checks outside normal working hours. Inspections should be guided by risk assessments and previous complaints, with mandatory verification that orders have been implemented. A unified record of inspections, measures imposed and their implementation should be established and linked with other authorities, including the Police Directorate and State Prosecution Service.

9.4. Ensure Remediation of Environmental Damage

The institutional response must continue beyond filing a complaint or imposing a penalty. Whenever damage is established, its extent, the remediation method, deadlines and the party responsible for carrying out the work must be determined. Restoration costs should primarily be borne by the responsible party, in line with the polluter-pays principle, which has been strengthened by recent legislation.

9.5. Integrate Environmental Risks into Development Planning

Strategic environmental assessments must precede investment and planning decisions, concession plans and the conclusion of concession agreements, rather than merely formally endorse a project already selected. Particular attention should be paid to the combined impacts of multiple projects on the coast, in riverbeds, forest complexes, protected areas and water supply zones. The public and local communities must be involved early enough to influence decisions meaningfully.

9.6. Set Sectoral Priorities

Water-sector priorities include building wastewater treatment systems, protecting water sources and combating illegal gravel extraction. Forestry requires better traceability of timber and satellite monitoring. Waste management should focus on prevention, separation, recycling and addressing tyres, construction waste and hazardous waste. Air quality and energy policy should reduce dependence on coal and ensure timely public information about health risks.

9.7. Protect Environmental Activists and Journalists

Threats, pressure and discrediting campaigns against activists and journalists must be investigated promptly and effectively. Institutions should strengthen contact points for environmental organisations and enable secure evidence submission through channels such as Čuvaj.me and the Police Directorate's new digital platform. Abuse of court proceedings intended to intimidate and exhaust people acting in the public interest must be prevented, particularly SLAPP lawsuits.

9.8. Provide Stable Support for Civic Action

Environmental organisations undertake sustained fieldwork, document problems and monitor institutional responses, yet largely rely on short-term projects. Transparent general-support programmes are needed for field monitoring, legal assistance, expert analysis and the development of local initiatives, while preserving organisations' independence from state institutions and donors.

Measure	Lead Institutions
A public register of environmental reports, cases, sanctions, damage and remediation	Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Northern Region Development (MERS), EPA, Supreme State Prosecutor's Office (VDT), Police Directorate (UP), inspection services
An operational protocol for police, prosecutors and inspectors, including machinery confiscation and financial investigations	Supreme State Prosecutor's Office and Police Directorate
Stronger inspection services based on mapped regional risks	Government and responsible ministries
A just transition plan for Pljevlja with a dedicated fund	Government, municipality, Eco Fund, EPCG / Pljevlja Coal Mine (RUP)
Local waste plans, separation at source and publication of tyre and plastic waste flows	Municipalities and MERS
Lasting protection of key rivers and canyons before energy decisions	Government, EPA and Parliament
A national anti-SLAPP mechanism and a protocol for protecting activists and complainants	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and the judiciary
Multi-year core grants and an emergency fund for activists	Donors, Eco Fund and Ministry of Public Administration
A public participation standard: 30 days, published comments and reasoned responses	All ministries and municipalities
Transparency of environmental media content: labelling paid content, funded travel and conflicts of interest	Media outlets, Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU) and self-regulatory bodies
An independent annual evaluation of "Čuvaj da te čuva" and Čuvaj.me	EU Delegation and partners

10. Conclusion

The findings show that environmental security in Montenegro encompasses public health, economic development, community security and the rule of law, as well as nature protection. Air and water pollution, illegal gravel extraction and logging, inadequate waste management, unauthorised construction and pressures on protected areas are interconnected problems. They reveal weaknesses in the governance of land and natural resources, marked by a pronounced gap between legislation and implementation.

The research confirms the important role of environmental activists, local initiatives, NGOs and investigative journalists in uncovering problems, gathering evidence, informing the public and prompting institutional responses. Campaigns to protect rivers from small hydropower plants, address illegal gravel extraction on the Morača and threats to the Bolje Sestre spring, oppose the planned Brskovo mine and tackle other local issues show that organised civic action can influence decisions and stop or limit harmful projects. These examples also reveal that institutions often respond only after sustained public pressure and substantial investment of civil society resources.

This situation is unsustainable. Activists cannot permanently assume the functions of inspectors, investigative bodies and other institutions, and their personal exposure must not be a precondition for law enforcement. The state must ensure timely oversight, effective investigations, perpetrator accountability, confiscation of illicit proceeds and remediation of damage. Civil society should retain its independent role in scrutiny, exposing failures and representing citizens and local communities.

Specialised capacity to combat environmental crime, more accessible digital reporting tools and stronger institutional cooperation represent important advances. Their success, however, must be measured by concrete outcomes: reduced pollution, fewer repeat environmental offences, more transparent and shorter proceedings, more remediated sites, more accessible data and better protection for people reporting harm. The number of bodies established, meetings held, reports submitted or inspections conducted is insufficient on its own.

Montenegro will make its constitutional commitment to being an ecological state a reality only when environmental protection becomes a routine, measurable institutional obligation, rather than the result of organisations' and individuals' persistence and personal risk.

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Numbers in square brackets in the text refer to the public sources below. Interviews are listed separately at the end.

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